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EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION
SANCTIONS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
By W. Gregory Vossi & Hugues Bouthinon-Dumasii
Prior to the application of the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), one result of the low maximum corporate fines for
violations under the preceding data protection legislation was,
arguably, a lack of compliance by U.S. Tech Giants and other
companies. At least on paper, this changed under the GDPR. This study
approaches the issue of GDPR sanctions, not through the lens of a
catastrophe waiting to happen, but instead though a development first
of the theoretical grounds for sanctions, prior to a view of the practical
side of them. In doing so, it is somewhat unique and adds to the GDPR
literature. Furthermore, it engages the legal strategy and compliance
literature to bring its results home to inform companies as to the risks
involved and to provide strategic recommendations both for companies
and for regulators.
Among the several sub-goals of sanctions, this study
determines that the most relevant for an analysis of GDPR sanctions—
which are administrative, regulatory and financial sanctions, in large
part—is the deterrence function, beyond the symbolic functions. This
demands effective and substantial administrative fines. While these are
not the only sanctions available under the GDPR—this study also sets
out a range of possible sanctions, such as judicial compensation and
orders to halt data processing—they are perhaps the most
characteristic of data protection enforcement. However, through what
is referred to as the one-stop-shop mechanism, the Irish DPA is the
lead authority for most of the U.S. Tech Giants, and it has failed to act
against them up to now, resulting in a potential lack of deterrence. This
study argues that, on the one hand, companies should embrace
compliance, and on the other hand, truly dissuasive administrative
fines must be issued by supervisory authorities when they are justified,
in order for the sanctions to have their necessary deterrence effect.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR),1 which has applied since May 25, 2018,2 has extraterritorial
effect,3 much as its predecessor legislation—the EU Data Protection
Directive4—did, but more so. However, such extraterritorial effect is—
this study argues—not of much use without effective incentive for
compliance and means of enforcement. In November 2015, a little
more than one month before political agreement was reached on EU
data protection law reform,5 and more than five months before its
adoption in the form of the GDPR,6 then-French State Secretary for
Digital Matters Axelle Lemaire estimated that the power to sanction of
the French data protection authority–the CNIL (Commission Nationale
de l’Informatique et des Libertés [National Commission for Computing
and Liberties])–was “peanuts” compared to the economic reality of
Internet giants, especially U.S. companies that dominate the market.7
1

Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016
O.J. (L 119) 1, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679 [hereinafter GDPR].
2
Id. art. 99(2).
3
For a brief discussion of this extraterritorial effect, see infra Section A of the
Introduction.
4
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data personal data and on the free Movement of such data, 1995 O.J.
(L 281) 31, 31 [hereinafter EU DP Directive].
5
Political agreement was reached on EU data protection reform on
December 15, 2015. See European Commission Press Release IP/15/6321,
Agreement on Commission's EU Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital
Single Market (Dec. 15, 2015).
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6321. Note that
the term “data protection,” is used within the European Union.
6
Various dates have been used for the adoption date of the GDPR. Certain
authors use the date it was approved by the Council of the European Union.
Some use the date that the GDPR was approved by the European Parliament;
others, the date of its publication in the Official Journal of European Union,
or twenty days thereafter, when it entered into force. The GDPR was actually
signed and dated on April 27, 2016. GDPR, supra note 1 (“Done at Brussels,
27 April 2016”).
7
Fabienne Schmitt, Le pouvoir de sanction de la CNIL, « c’est cacahouète »
[The CNIL’s Sanctioning Power: “It’s Peanuts”], LESECHOS.FR (Nov. 3,
2015), https://www.lesechos.fr/03/11/2015/LesEchos/22058-101-ECH_le-
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At the time the maximum administrative sanction that the CNIL was
able to impose was €150,000,8 or the then-equivalent of approximately
$165,000.9 This was a sum that then-EU Justice Commissioner Viviane
Reding described as “pocket money,” when in 2014 the CNIL issued a
fine against Google in that amount.10
However, since May 25, 2018, the date the GDPR first
11
applied, EU Member State data protection supervisory authorities
such as the CNIL can issue administrative sanctions for the most severe
data protection violations by companies in the amount of the greater of
€20 million or 4% of worldwide annual turnover for the prior year.12
At least on paper, it’s not peanuts anymore! Much attention has been
paid to this increase in potential EU sanctions for data protection
violations.13 This is comprehensible given the importance of data in
pouvoir-de-sanction-de-la-cnil----c-est-cacahouete-.htm?texte=LESECHOS:%20Le%20pouvoir%20de%20sanction%20de%20l
a%20CNIL,%20«%20c’est%20cacahouète%20».
8
See Hazel Grant & Hannah Crowther, How Effective Are Fines in Enforcing
Privacy?, in ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES 287, 301 (David Wright & Paul De Hert, eds.,
2016).
9
Currency Converter, OANDA,
https://www.oanda.com/lang/fr/currency/converter/ (calculated using
historical currency exchange figures for Nov. 3, 2015).
10
See European Commission Press Release, Speech: The EU Data Protection
Reform: Helping Businesses Thrive in the Digital Economy (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-37_en.htm
(“Taking
Google's 2012 performance figures, the fine in France represents 0.0003% of
its global turnover. Pocket money.”). One journalist referred to a 2017 CNIL
fine against Facebook in the same amount as a “slap on the wrist.” See also
Mark Scott, Facebook Gets Slap on the Wrist from 2 European Privacy
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2rlzS4O.
11
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 99(2).
12
Id. art. 83(5).
13
See, e.g., ONNO JANSSEN ET AL., THE PRICE OF DATA SECURITY: A GUIDE
TO THE INSURABILITY OF GDPR FINES ACROSS EUROPE 3 (3rd ed., 2020)
(“The scale of these fines has understandably generated concern in
boardrooms. GDPR has replaced a regime under which fines for a data
breach were limited and enforcement actions infrequent. The regulatory
environment across European Member States is undoubtedly shifting and
regulators now have greater powers of enforcement, and significant GDPR
fines are expected to be imposed where organisations are subject to
investigations.”),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2020/05/third-editionof-guide-on-the-insurability-of-gdpr-fines-across-europe/. See also Omer
Tene, With Hefty GDPR Fines, a New Industry Emerges, IAPP (July 12,
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today’s economy—described variously as the new gold or the new oil14
—and due to the extraterritorial reach of the GDPR. This study looks
at these sanctions and other remedies under the GDPR both from
theoretical and practical perspectives. The essential research question
posited by this study is, does the reality of supervisory authority action
support the theoretical goals for GDPR sanctions, and what strategic
recommendations for both firms and supervisory authorities result?
This introduction continues with an initial brief explanation of
the GDPR (Section A), followed by a discussion of the U.S. Tech
Giants (Section B)—companies whose business model may be strongly
impacted by the GDPR due to their use of personal data,15 and ending
with an introduction on data protection sanctions (Section C).
A. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
The GDPR is the European Union’s omnibus data protection
legislation,16 taking the form of an EU regulation, which means that it
2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/with-hefty-gdpr-fines-a-new-industryemerges/ (discussing the new privacy tech industry, the author comments
about the effect of GDPR fines: “With mega fines come heightened
responsibilities for companies, directors and officers.”).
14
See, e.g., W. Gregory Voss, Internet, New Technologies, and Value: Taking
Share of Economic Surveillance, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 469, 471
(2017).
15
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of
Google and Facebook or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L &
TECH. 1, [1]–[5] (2018); see also David Meyer, Europe’s Privacy Laws are
Tough. Meet the Woman Who Could Make Them Costly for Facebook and
Google, FORTUNE (Oct. 28, 2019, 3:30), https://fortune.com/2019/10/28/gdpreurope-helen-dixon-ireland-privacy-laws-facebook-google/ (“If the U.S.
firms lose in major cases, Dixon could order them to pay fines as high as 4%
of global annual revenue; a negative ruling could also expose them to even
more expensive civil suits. More importantly, they may face new limits on
how they acquire, share, and use personal data—the lifeblood of today’s addriven tech economy.”).
16
Omnibus (or comprehensive) data protection legislation contrasts with the
U.S. sectoral/self-regulatory model. See W. Gregory Voss, Internal
Compliance Mechanisms for Firms in the EU General Data Protection
Regulation, 50 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 783, 789 (2018). Note that the
GDPR also applies in the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement
countries of Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein. In this sense, see also Decision
of the EEA Joint Committee No 154/2018 of 6 July 2018 amending Annex XI
(Electronic communication, audiovisual services and information society) and
Protocol 37 (containing the list provided for in Article 101) to the EEA
Agreement [2018/1022], 2018 O.J. (L 183) 23. Nonetheless, this study will
continue to refer to the European Union in its discussion of the GDPR.
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is directly applicable throughout the European Union.17 The GDPR has
a dual objective—to protect “fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal
data”18 and to guarantee the “free movement of personal data” within
the European Union.19 The GDPR recognizes that, thanks to new
technologies, private companies (such as the U.S. Tech Giants), are
able “to make use of personal data on an unprecedented scale in order
to pursue their activities.”20 As a result, there is a need to make
operators more responsible and to have strong enforcement by the
regulatory authorities, with a view to creating trust in the digital
economy.21 The GDPR stipulates that in order for personal data—a
very broad concept in the European Union drafted to include a range
of information that can be tied to an identified or identifiable natural

17

See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, art. 288, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 171–72 [hereinafter TFEU]. See also
Irina Alexe, The Sanctioning Regime Provided by Regulation (EU) 2016/679
on the Protection of Personal Data, 2017 INT’L LAW REVIEW 60, 61 (2018).
18
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 1(2). This right to personal data protection is
enshrined in the TFEU. See TFEU, supra note 17, art. 16. It is also contained
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. See Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 397.
Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
provides “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning
him or her.” For a discussion of the modification of the legal status of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to make it legally
binding, and for the incorporation of the right to personal data protection into
the TFEU, see GLORIA GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL
DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU 231–234 (2014).
19
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 1(3). This is part of what Lynskey refers to as part
of the “economic underpinning” of the legislation. See ORLA LYNSKEY, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 8 (2015). Lynskey also
discusses the legislative goal of market harmonization. Id. at 66-67 (“The
increased emphasis on the effectiveness of fundamental rights in the
Commission’s proposal for a Regulation did not detract attention from its
emphasis on market harmonization … the substantive provisions of the
Commission’s initial proposal also evidenced its ambition to create a uniform
regulatory environment for data processing in the EU.”).
20
GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 6.
21
Id. Recital 7.
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person (data subject)22—to be processed (another broad term),23 there
must be a legal basis for such processing, such as consent, when the
GDPR applies.24 Moreover, a large range of rights must be furnished
to data subjects,25 and data information principles (similar to fair
information principles) apply,26 including the requirement that
measures must be taken to ensure the security of the personal data.27
The GDPR operates when its provisions regarding material and
territorial scope are met,28 among which, new extraterritorial coverage
22

“Personal data” are defined as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological,
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.”
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(1). For a discussion of the broadness of this term
and its meaning, see W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A. Houser, Personal Data
and the GDPR: Providing a Competitive Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56
AM. BUS. L.J. 287, 313–24 (2019). For an earlier development of this issue,
prior to the finalization of the GDPR, see Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J.
Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European
Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 877 (2014).
23
“Processing” is defined as “any operation or set of operations which is
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by
automated means, such as collection, recording, organization, structuring,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.” GDPR, supra note 1, art.
4(2).
24
Consent is one of six legal bases for the processing of personal data. The
others are where the processing is necessary for: the performance of a contract
to which the data subject is a party, compliance of a legal obligation of the
controller, the protection of the data subject’s (or another individual’s) vital
interests, the performance of a public interest task or one under public
authority, or the controller’s legitimate interest. However, this last basis may
be overridden by the data subject’s fundamental rights. Id. art. 6(1).
25
These include information requirements with respect to the processing. Id.
arts. 13–14. A right of access to his or her data is provided, as well. Id. art. 15.
A right to rectification applies, too. Id. art. 16. Furthermore, there is a new
right to erasure (“right to be forgotten”). GDPR, supra note 1, art. 17. A right
to obtain restrictions of processing is furnished in certain circumstances. Id.
art. 18. In addition to other rights, there is a new right to data portability. Id.
art. 20. For other rights (right to object and right not to be subjected to
automated individual decision-making), see id. arts. 21–22.
26
Id. art. 5.
27
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(f).
28
Id. arts. 2–3.
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where data of data subjects in the European Union are being processed
in connection with the offer of goods or services (whether for pay or in
exchange for the personal data, without payment) or where the
behavior of data subjects in the European Union is being monitored,
when such behavior occurs within the European Union.29 In such cases,
the companies collecting and processing the data do not need to have
an establishment in the European Union in order to be required to
comply with the GDPR, but they may be required to appoint a
representative in the European Union.30
B. The U.S. Tech Giants
As measured almost three and one-half years after Axelle
Lemaire spoke, and ten months after the GDPR became applicable, five
of the six largest U.S. firms by market value were in the sector of
information technology and Internet (including e-commerce and social
media): (in order) Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet (Google), and
Facebook.31 One journalist has referred to these companies, which
each amass tens of billions of dollars in revenue annually, as the
“Frightful Five,” and has remarked upon the domination of these firms,
and their recent loss of goodwill both among the public and U.S.
regulatory and legal infrastructure, as such firms have moved from
“disrupters” to “incumbents.”32 These same firms have been referred
to by Europeans as the “GAFAM” (for Google, Apple, Facebook,
Amazon, and Microsoft),33 and such firms have similarly lost goodwill,
especially since the revelation of the N.S.A. PRISM mass surveillance

29

The new provision reads:
2.
This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data
of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not
established in the Union where the processing activities are related
to:
(a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a
payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the
Union; or
(b) the monitoring of their behavior as far as their behavior takes
place within the Union. Id. art. 3(2).
30
Id. art. 27.
31
The ranking is as of March 29, 2019. The other firm making up the six
largest market valuations was Berkshire Hathaway, at fourth place, ahead of
Amazon. See Fortune 500, FORTUNE 2019,
https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/search/.
32
Farhad Manjoo, Tech Giants Seem Invincible. That Worries Lawmakers.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jD5mCK.
33
For a discussion of this, see Voss, supra note 14, at 474 n.28.
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program34 involving the participation of all but one of them.35 Another
term used has been “Big Tech.”36 For ease of reference and to retain
the tie to their nation of origin, this study retains the use of the term
“the U.S. Tech Giants,”37 keeping in mind that this grouping is
established merely as a shorthand way of discussing the largest U.S.
technology companies, and that there are many distinctions between
the companies that make up such grouping.38 Much of what is said
about the U.S. Tech Giants also applies to other U.S. companies mainly
active on the Internet, such as Netflix, Airbnb, Tesla, and Uber, which
have also been referred to as the "NATU."39
Certain of the U.S. Tech Giants have been the subject of
prosecution or investigation in Europe for tax and competition law
violations, areas of law often categorized as falling within the ambit of
international economic law (IEL).40 At the EU level, for instance, the
34

See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2nJdWCF.
35
See GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE 107–09 (2014). The lone
exception was Amazon.
36
For use of the term “big tech,” see, e.g., Sherrod Brown, Privacy Isn’t a
Right You Can Click Away, WIRED (June 29, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/privacy-isnt-a-right-you-can-click-away/. See
also Adam Satariano & Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Big Tech’s Toughest
Opponent Says She’s Just Getting Started, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/2QA8ZtF (discussing EU competition law enforcement efforts
against companies such as Apple, Uber, Amazon, Facebook and Google).
37
For prior use of this term, see, e.g., Ellen Huet & Alex Webb,
US Tech Giants Face Splintered Digital Future in EU, SFGATE (June 28,
2016; updated, June 28, 2016 4:42 PM),
https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/US-tech-giants-face-splintereddigital-future-in-8330585.php).
38
See e.g., Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 332–38 (contrasting the legal
strategy pathways of Facebook and Google, on the one hand, and Amazon,
Microsoft and Apple, on the other hand).
39
See Pierre Haski, Après les Gafa, les nouveaux maîtres du monde sont les
Natu [After the Gafa, the New Masters of the World are the Natu], L’OBS
AVEC RUE 89 (Jan. 26, 2017, 12:56 PM),
https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/20150802.RUE3739/apres-les-gafa-lesnouveaux-maitres-du-monde-sont-les-natu.html.
40
“Tax activity” and “corporate activity” that is the subject of bilateral or other
international treaties, is considered to be part of international economic law
(IEL). See JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (2006). See also Steve
Charnovitz, What Is International Economic Law?, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 5–
6 (2011) (including competition/antitrust and double taxation in the definition
of international economic law, as legal norms “legislated (or alluded to) in the

2021]

EU GDPR SANCTIONS

11

European Commission concluded that Luxembourg tax rulings in favor
of Amazon constituted illegal state aid in an amount of $295 million
(€250 million) and must be recovered from Amazon by Luxembourg,41
and likewise that two Irish tax rulings in favor of Apple constitute
illegal state aid in an amount of up to €13 billion, which must be
recovered from the company by Ireland.42 However, the decision in
the Irish tax rulings case was eventually annulled by the General Court
of the European Union,43 although such annulment is being appealed
by the Commission,44 and various EU member state efforts to recover
taxes from certain U.S. Tech Giants have resulted in settlements.45
law of the World Trade Organization (WTO).” Charnovitz even includes legal
norms regarding “the internet” as part of “international legal norms that are
not part of the WTO,” which fit within the definition of international economic
law).
41
See European Commission Press Release IP/17/3701, State Aid:
Commission finds Luxembourg gave illegal tax benefits to Amazon worth
around €250 million (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_3701. See also
Robert-Jan Bartunek, EU Orders Amazon to Repay $295 Million in
Luxembourg Back Taxes, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2017, 2:37 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-amazon-taxavoidance/eu-ordersamazon-to-repay-295-million-in-luxembourg-back-taxes-idUSKCN1C913S.
42
Commission Decision 2017/1283, on State Aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex
2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple, 2017 O.J. (L 187)
1, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D1283&from=EN. In 2017, the
European Commission referred Ireland to the Court of Justice of the
European Union for failure to recover such amounts. See also Press Release,
European Commission, State Aid: Commission refers Ireland to Court for
failure to recover illegal tax benefits recover illegal tax benefits from Apple
worth up to €13 Billion (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_3702.
43
European Union Press Release 90/20, General Court of the European Union,
The General Court of the European Union annuls the decision taken by the
Commission regarding the Irish tax rulings in favour of Apple (July 15, 2020),
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/202007/cp200090en.pdf.
44
Foo Yun Chee, EU's Vestager Appeals Court Veto of $15 Billion Apple
Tax Order, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2020 11:52 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-apple-taxation-idUSKCN26G1DB.
45
See, e.g., Daniel Boffey & Jill Treanor, Google £130m UK Back-Tax Deal
Lambasted as ‘Derisory’ by Expert, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2016, 17:05),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/23/google-uk-back-taxdeal-lambasted-as-derisory (discussing £130 million settlement between
Google and the UK); See also Reuters Staff, Amazon to Pay 100 Million Euros
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France adopted a “GAFA” (or digital services) tax, aimed at ensuring
that the U.S. Tech Giants pay a fair share of their French revenue to the
French tax authorities,46 and other European countries are considering
similar measures.47
Furthermore, EU competition law sanctions have involved
significant sums of money—in a 2013 report, prior to the application
of the GDPR, EU competition law fines were shown to have an impact
on U.S. international transactions accounts, while EU data protection
fines were absent from the analysis.48 EU competition law cases have
resulted in fines of €561 million against Microsoft for not complying
with anti-tying commitments in an antitrust case involving Internet

to Settle Italy Tax Dispute, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2017, 5:03 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-italy-tax/amazon-to-pay-100million-euros-to-settle-italy-tax-dispute-idUSKBN1E91KM
(reporting
agreement between the Italian tax authority and Amazon to collect €100
million ($118 million) in back taxes for the period 2011–2015); See also Mark
Scott, Google Agrees to Pay Italy $334 Million in Back Taxes, N.Y. TIMES
(May 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2pL2Z3Z (detailing agreement between Italian
authorities and Google to recover €306 million ($334 million) in back taxes
for 2002–2015 and mentioning a similar 2015 agreement between Apple and
Italy for €314 million in back taxes); Microsoft has also agreed to enter into
an agreement with the French Ministry in charge of taxation for €350 million
for corporate income tax for the period 2010–2012. See David Bensoussan,
Microsoft passe un accord avec le fisc français [Microsoft Makes an
Agreement with the French Tax Authorities], CHALLENGES (June 5, 2019,
18:58),
https://www.challenges.fr/economie/microsoft-passe-un-accordavec-le-fisc-francais_657176.
46
See Liz Alderman, France Moves to Tax Tech Giants, Stoking Fight with
White House, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2Lh1iXo. France
has delayed collecting such tax—also referred to as a digital services tax—in
order to allow time to negotiate a deal on the resulting dispute with the United
States through the OECD. France had planned to collect such tax starting at
the end of 2020. See also Mark Sweney, UK and Europe Renew Calls for
Global Digital Tax as US Quits Talks, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 18, 2020, 9:40),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/jun/18/uk-europe-global-digitaltax-us-quits-talks-tech.
47
See Lilian V. Faulhaber, Beware. Other Nations Will Follow France With
Their Own Digital Tax., N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/2XKGsBC.
48
See Christopher L. Bach, Fines and Penalties in the U.S. International
Transactions Accounts, BEA 57 (July 2013),
https://apps.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2013/07%20July/0713_fines_penalties_internati
onal_accounts.pdf.
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Explorer and Windows OS software,49 periodic penalties of €899
million against Microsoft in an antitrust case involving a refusal to
provide interoperability information to vendors of work group server
operating system products.50 The European Commission has also fined
Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as a search engine by
giving illegal advantage to its own comparison shopping service,51 and
more recently €4.34 billion (or $5.1 billion52) for illegal actions related
to the Android mobile operating system, which were aimed at
strengthening Google’s dominant position in internet search,53 and
€1.49 billion for abuse of its dominant position in online search
advertisements through restrictive AdSense for Search contractual
clauses requiring publishers using AdSense for Search to effectively
reserve the most profitable spaces in their search results for Google
advertisements, thereby disfavoring search engine competitors such as

49
See European Commission Press Release IP/13/196, Commission fines
Microsoft for non-compliance with browser choice commitments (Mar. 6,
2013), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_196.
50
Commission Decision of February 27, 2008, fixing the definitive amount of
the periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft Corporation by Decision
C (2005) 4420 final, 2009 O.J. (C 166). This fine was upheld but reduced to
€860 million by the General Court. See James Kanter, In European Court, a
Small Victory for Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012),
https://nyti.ms/MAx1tU.
51
Commission Decision of June 27, 2017, relating to proceedings under
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and
Article 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping)) C (2017) 76, 213, available at
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_1499
6_3.pdf.
52
See Debra Cassens Weiss, EU Punishes Google with Record $5.1B
Antitrust Fine for Deals Requiring Preinstalled Apps, Services, ABA
JOURNAL (July 18, 2018, 8:48 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/eu_punishes_google_with_record_5
.1b_antitrust_fine_for_deals_requiring_prei.
53
See European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust:
Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding Android
mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google's search engine (July 18,
2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4581.
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Microsoft and Yahoo.54 In addition, the European Commission
obtained commitments from Amazon in a case relating to e-books.55
C. Introduction to Data Protection Sanctions
Moreover, and more pertinent to our study, certain of the
practices of the U.S. Tech Giants have also been subject to sanction by
various EU Member State data protection authorities (DPAs),56 called
“supervisory authorities” in the GDPR,57 and by other regulatory
authorities even if they are not specifically in charge of data protection,
such as competition authorities,58 or financial authorities59 such as the
54
See European Commission Press Release IP/19/1770, Antitrust:
Commission fines Google €1.49 billion for abusive practices in online
advertising (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1770.
55
See Summary of Commission Decision of May 4, 2017, relating to a
proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.40153 — E-Book
MFNS and related matters), 2017 O.J. (C 264) 7, available at https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0811(02)
&from=EN.
56
See, e.g., Houser & Voss, supra note 15, at 20–35.
57
“Supervisory authority” is defined in the GDPR as “an independent public
authority which is established by a Member State pursuant to Article 51.”
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(21). Pursuant to Article 51, it is charged with
“monitoring the application of [the GDPR], in order to protect the fundamental
rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to processing and to
facilitate the free flow of personal data within the [European] Union.” Id. art.
51(1). Note that this study will use the term “supervisory authority,” or,
alternatively, “DPA,” to indicate this form of regulatory authority.
58
See Commission Decision of May 17, 2017, Case M.8228 —
Facebook/WhatsApp, notified under document C(2017) 3192; see also
Preliminary Assessment in Facebook Proceeding: Facebook’s Collection and
Use of Data From Third-Party Sources is Abusive, BUNDESKARTELLAMT
(Dec. 19, 2017), quoted in PAUL FRIEDRICH NEMITZ, FINES UNDER THE GDPR
4–5 (2017) .
59
See, e.g., Financial Services Authority (U.K.), Final Notice to HSBC
Actuaries and Consultants Limited, July 17, 2009 (regarding fines totaling
over
£
3
million
against
companies
of
the
HSBC),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/hsbc_actuaris0709.pdf; see
also Financial Services Authority (U.K.), Final Notice to HSBC Life (UK)
Limited (July 17, 2009), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/finalnotices/hsbc_inuk0907.pdf; see also Financial Services Authority (U.K.),
Final Notice to HSBC Insurance Brokers Limited (July 17, 2009),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/hsbc_ins0709.pdf. For an
additional example, see also Financial Services Authority (U.K.), Final Notice
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UK Financial Services Authority.60 Paul Nemitz refers to data
protection and competition law both falling within “special economic
administrative law,”61 and the GDPR looks to competition law for the
definition of “undertaking,” used to determine the level of sanctions
applicable in data protection enforcement actions.62 However, many of
the enforcement actions against the U.S. Tech Giants have been under
the EU DP Directive,63 the legislation that preceded and was repealed
by the GDPR, and resulted in relatively small sanctions when
compared to those in tax and competition law cases, and certainly when
compared to the annual revenue of the U.S. Tech Giants. As an
example, these could only go up to a maximum of €150,000 (for a first
offense) in France; €900,000 in Spain, and £500,000 in the United
Kingdom.64
One definition of “sanction” is “[a] provision that gives force
to a legal imperative by either rewarding obedience or punishing
disobedience.”65 Likewise, “sanctioning” has been defined as “the
formal reaction to a violation of the law by the authorities” and it may
be punitive or restorative.66 Effective sanctions are seen as necessary
for obtaining compliance with legal rules,67 especially when people do
not spontaneously comply with the rules because they consider them
fair and deserving of respect for that reason alone. The imposing of
sanctions is one tool of enforcement, as we have seen, and enforcement
in turn is meant to put into application legal standards meant to

to Zurich Insurance Plc, UK branch, Aug. 19, 2010 (regarding a fine of
££2,275 million pounds against Zurich Insurance). On the latter fine, see also
Nemitz, supra note 58, at 14.
60
Nemitz, supra note 58, at 14–15.
61
Id. at 3.
62
GDPR, supra note 1, recital (150) (referring to TFEU arts. 101 and 102, the
provisions regarding, respectively, illegal cartels and abuse of a dominant
position).
63
EU DP Directive, supra note 4.
64
See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8, at 301.
65
Sanction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
66
Miroslava Scholten et al., The Proliferation of EU Enforcement Authorities:
A New Development in Law Enforcement in the EU, in LAW ENFORCEMENT
BY EU AUTHORITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 5 (Miroslava Scholten & Michiel Luchtman, eds., 2017).
67
See Sebastian J. Golla, Is Data Protection Law Growing Teeth? The Current
Lack of Sanctions in Data Protection Law and Administrative Fines Under the
GDPR, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 70, 70 (2017), (citing
THOMAS RAISER, GRUNDLAGEN DER RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 253 (Mohr Siebeck
6th ed. 2013)).

16

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 37

influence behavior.68 Indeed, effectiveness of sanctions may be
evaluated by first identifying the desired outcome, such as
discouraging non-compliance, encouraging good practice, or raising
awareness of privacy rights, for example,69 and comparing this to the
result achieved. However, it is more difficult to measure compliance
with privacy laws than to measure enforcement.70 Sanctions may take
many forms beyond the basic carrot and the stick announced in the
definition of the term. For example, there are criminal sanctions,71
administrative sanctions,72 and civil sanctions.73 In addition, as various
factors may need to be taken into account in the application of
sanctions, their level may not be fixed once and for all but determined

68

See David Wright & Paul De Hert, Introduction to Enforcing Privacy, in
ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
APPROACHES 1, 2 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2016) (defining
enforcement as “to translate a set of legal standards designed to influence
human and institutional behavior into social reality” (citation omitted)).
69
See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8, at 290.
70
See Graham Greenleaf, Responsive Regulation of Data Privacy: Theory and
Asian Examples, in ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES 233, 234 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds.,
2016) (commenting that enforcement may be measured by published national
statistics and case studies, whereas few studies of compliance exist).
71
A criminal sanction may be defined as “[a] sanction attached to a criminal
conviction, such as a fine or restitution.” Criminal Sanction, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
72
In the United States, administrative sanctions have been upheld by courts
“on the basis of the remedial or regulatory ingredients of the sanctions”
(citations omitted), rather than the penal element of sanctions. See Lillian R.
Altree, Administrative Sanctions: Regulations and Adjudication, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 630, 632–33 (1964). In the European Union, administrative sanctions
have taken several forms: “such as the loss of a deposit, the administrative
fine, the surcharge, the exclusion from subsidies and blacklisting.” See also
Adrienne de Moor-van Vugt, Administrative Sanctions in EU Law, 5 REV.
EUR. ADMIN. L. 5 (2012). This study is more focused on administrative fines,
although other forms of sanctions are discussed as well.
73
Grant and Crowther refer to a “civil penalty ordered by a court,” in addition
to administrative or criminal penalties. See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8,
at 288.
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on a case-by-case basis instead.74 Furthermore, there are sanctions
specific to various areas of law.75
The sanctions involved in the specific field of European Union
data protection law are at the heart of this study, which is organized as
follows: after this Introduction, Part I deals with the theory of sanctions
and their goals as applied to EU data protection law. Part II of the study
focuses on the nature of sanctions provided by the EU data protection
law, starting with the EU DP Directive and continuing with the GDPR.
Part III of the study analyzes the strategic risks involved in firms’ lack
of understanding of, and non-compliance with, the GDPR, and the risks
of supervisory authorities’ non-enforcement of the GDPR; Part IV
provides recommendations both to firms and to the authorities in this
regard. In Part V, conclusory remarks are made.
I.

GOALS OF SANCTIONS

Before detailing the objectives of the sanctions that the DPAs
of the European Member States may impose to enforce the GDPR, it is
necessary to specify the nature of these sanctions: they are financial,
administrative and regulatory. 76 First, the sanctions in question are
financial sanctions, such as fines, as they consist of the relevant DPA
obliging the sanctioned entities to pay a sum of money if they do not
comply with the obligations provided by the GDPR.77 The sums to be
paid following a determination of a data protection violation by a
regulatory authority must be paid into the budget of the nation where
the sanction is imposed.78
74
See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5 (f) (2018). See also
id. ch. 8 (for chapter entitled, Sentencing of Organizations: Introductory
Commentary, which states that “[ . . . ] The two factors that mitigate the
ultimate punishment of an organization are: (i) the existence of an effective
compliance and ethics program; and (ii) self-reporting, co-operation, or
acceptance of responsibility.”).
75
For example, there may be compensation for harm for negligence or strict
liability in torts law, as well as punitive damages; in contracts law there are
expectation damages, but also potentially specific performance; in criminal
law, punishment; under regulation, penalty sanctions, and so on. Robert
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1538–51 (1984).
76
Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, The Implementation of Administrative Fines
Under the General Data Protection Regulation from the German Perspective,
2 INT'L J. FOR THE DATA PROTECTION OFFICER, PRIVACY OFFICER & PRIVACY
COUNS. 11, 14 (2018).
77
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83.
78
For example, for the United Kingdom, see GDPR Penalties and Fines:
Who Gets the Money from GDPR Fines?, IT GOVERNANCE,
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Secondly, these sanctions are administrative79 because they are
not imposed by courts as such but by administrative bodies.80 More
specifically, they are regulatory sanctions because the power to
sanction given to DPAs is part of their regulatory powers.81 Even if
these sanctions are not criminal penalties, they are nevertheless
criminal matters within the meaning of Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), guaranteeing a right to a fair
trial.82 Indeed, Article 83(8) provides, in a similar manner, that “[t]he
exercise by the supervisory authority of its powers under this Article
shall be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance

https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/dpa-and-gdpr-penalties (“All fines collected
by the ICO go to HM Treasury’s Consolidated Fund to be spent on health
and social care, education, policing and justice, and the like.”) (last visited
on Oct. 24, 2020); for France, see Julien Lausson, Où va l’argent quand les
géants de la tech paient des amendes? [Where Does the Money Go When
Tech Giants Pay Fines?], NUMERAMA (Nov. 3, 2019),
https://www.numerama.com/politique/565914-ou-va-largent-quand-lesgeants-du-net-paient-des-amendes.html (“ces montants, lorsqu’ils
proviennent de décisions de la CNIL, sont versés au budget français" [these
amounts, when they come from CNIL decisions, are paid to the French
budget.]).
79
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Application
and Setting of Administrative Fines for the Purposes of the Regulation
2016/679, WP 253 (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=611237
[hereinafter WP 253].
80
Article 83(9) allows for the penalties for violations of the GDPR to be
“initiated by the competent supervisory authority and imposed by competent
national courts”. See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(9). This provision is
exceptional. Denmark and Estonia use this possibility, because they do not use
administrative fines. See also Wolff, supra note 76, at 13; See also, GDPR,
supra note 1, Recital 151.
81
See GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 129. DPAs’ powers are more extended
than under the directive. See Philip Schütz, The Set Up of Data Protection
Authorities as a New Regulatory Approach in EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION:
IN GOOD HEALTH? 1, 14 (S. Gutwirth, R. Leenes, P. de Hert & Y Poullet, eds.,
2012) (“the Directive provides DPAs with investigative powers, effective
powers of intervention and the power to engage in legal proceedings.”).
82
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230. This
Convention applies in the EU Member States and in the other nations of the
Council of Europe. See also Engel and others vs. The Netherlands, 1976 Eur.
Ct. Hr. 1, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/tur#{%22itemid%22:[%2200157479%22]}. See also Oztürk vs. Germany, 1984 Eur. Ct. Hr. 1,
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/tur#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57552%22]}.
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with Union and Member State law, including effective judicial remedy
and due process.”83
By their nature, the regulatory sanctions provided for in the
GDPR are different from strictly criminal sanctions. Thus, criminal
courts may use penalties of a different nature, such as fines, whereas
DPAs may not order prison sentences at all.84 Besides, malicious
intention is not required for administrative sanctions.85 Regulatory
sanctions imposed on regulated entities are also distinct from the
sanctions that may be imposed on the managers of regulated companies
in person.86 Regulatory sanctions are distinct from civil sanctions,
particularly in the context of private enforcement, which allows victims
to obtain damages to compensate for the harm they have suffered.87
The primary purpose of regulatory sanctions is not the reparation, but
rather the punishment of offenders.88 The financial sanctions that DPAs
may impose are also different from injunctions and other
administrative or coercive measures such as the withdrawal of an
administrative authorization or an obligation to implement a
compliance program.89 It is important to bear in mind that financial
penalties imposed by DPAs on regulated companies may be in addition
to or as an alternative to these other types of sanctions.90
83

GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(8).
See Mitchel A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and
Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 89–90 (1984). See also Cyrus Chu &
Neville Jiang, Are Fines More Efficient Than Imprisonment?, 51 J. PUB. ECON.
391, 391–92 (1993).
85
Intention is only a circumstance that must be taken into account when
sentencing. See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2)(b).
86
See OECD, Cartels: Sanctions Against Individuals, 9(3) OECD J.:
COMPETITION
L&
POL’Y
7,
10
(2007),
https://read.oecdilibrary.org/governance/cartels-sanctions-against-individuals_clp-v9-art10en (“As corporate sanctions rarely are sufficiently high to be an optimal
deterrent against cartels, there is a place for sanctions against natural persons
that can complement corporate sanctions and provide an enhancement to
deterrence.”).
87
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 82 and Recitals 146–47.
88
WP 253, supra note 79, at 6 (“The assessment of what is effective,
proportional and dissuasive in each case will have to also reflect the objective
pursued by the corrective measure chosen, that is either to reestablish
compliance with the rules, or to punish”).
89
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION
29, 31 (2002).
90
See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2) (“Administrative fines shall, depending
on the circumstances of each individual case, be imposed in addition to, or
84
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The raison d’être for regulatory sanctions is specific, and it
explains that there are regulatory sanctions in addition to other
categories of sanctions that are typically criminal, civil, or
administrative.91 Regulatory sanctions can contribute to pursuing the
same goals as other types of sanctions.92 However, ultimately,
regulatory sanctions aim to ensure the effectiveness of the whole legal
framework that the supervisory authorities are responsible for
enforcing.93
The functions of sanctions that are traditionally identified as
criminal, civil, or administrative sanctions appear as sub-goals to
ultimately achieve the key objective of compliance with the rules that
European data protection legislation intends to promote and
guarantee.94
In order to present the different goals that regulatory sanctions
of DPAs can achieve, this study proposes to draw inspiration from the
theories of sanctions and sentencing.95 However, in order to streamline
instead of, measures referred to in points (a) to (h) and (j) of Article 58(2).”).
Article 58(2) sets out the corrective powers of DPAs. Id. art. 58(2). On the
various GDPR sanctions, see also infra Part II.
91
See WP 253, supra note 79, at 4 (“Administrative fines are a central element
in the new enforcement regime introduced by the Regulation, being a powerful
part of the enforcement toolbox of the supervisory authorities together with
the other measures provided by article 58.”).
92
See Ioannis Lianos et al., An Optimal and Just Financial Penalties System
for Infringements of Competition Law: A Comparative Analysis, 27 CLES,
Research Paper No. 3/2014, 2014, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2542991 (“From
a legal standpoint, sanctions could pursue a number of other goals such as
retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation etc. Usually laws, and competition
law is no exception, do not clearly specify what the goal of law enforcement
is supposed to be. These goals are not necessarily in conflict with the goal of
deterrence pursued by the economic approach.”).
93
See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 2 (“Whether Article 83 GDPR can fulfil
its function in practice will depend crucially on its implementation by the Data
Protection Authorities: It will be essential that the supervisory authorities are
adequately resourced in terms of infrastructure, personnel and finances in
order to be able to fulfil their role, also vis-à-vis internationally and globally
active companies, thus enabling the GDPR to be implemented and applied
effectively”). See also Richard Macrory, Reforming Regulatory Sanctions –
Designing a Systematic Approach, in THE REGULATORY STATE:
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 229, 230 (Dawn Olivier et al., eds., 2010).
94
See GDPR, supra note 1, Recitals 11 & 129.
95
See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404–05 (1958). See also Julian V. Roberts & Andrew
Von Hirsch, Legislating the Purpose and Principles of Sentencing, in MAKING
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the presentation of these different functions and to highlight the
specific issues attached to these sanctions, this study proposes an
original analytical framework. This framework is based on a double
distinction with regard to the functions of sanctions. First, we
distinguish between the symbolic and material functions of sanctions,96
and secondly, we distinguish between the retrospective (backwardoriented) and prospective (forward-oriented) natures of sanctions.97
A sanction always has content. It consists, for example, of
depriving a person of his or her liberty, forcing him or her to pay a
certain amount of money or to perform a certain action. This content
can be said to be material. The materiality of the sanction is obvious
when the sanction is a fine. As such, the sanction aims at changing
something in the state of the world (by a transfer of wealth, by a
remedial measure, etc.).98 But the sanction also has a meaning
independently of its content, by the very fact that it is a sanction: this
is the symbolic aspect of the sanction.99 The sanction is, in fact, a
SENSE OF SENTENCING 48, 51 (J. V. Roberts & D.P. Cole, eds., 1999); See
generally, MICHAEL TONRY, WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON
PUNISHMENT (2011); See also ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, Making Sentencing Policy
More Rational and More Effective, 25 ISR. L. REV. 607, 608 (1991); See also
PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINING SENTENCING. THE PROMISE AND THE
REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 3 (1991) (“the four traditional purposes of
the criminal sanction: rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, and
retribution”).
96
This study notes that this distinction does not cover the distinction between
monetary and non-monetary sanctions. A sanction such as imprisonment is
not monetary, but it is not purely symbolic! A monetary sanction can be
essentially symbolic; if the amount is very small, especially in view of the
financial capacity of the person sanctioned.
97
See Mustapha Mekki, Considérations sociologiques sur le droit des
sanctions [Sociological Considerations on the Law of Sanctions], in LES
SANCTIONS EN DROIT CONTEMPORAIN. LA SANCTION, ENTRE TECHNIQUE ET
POLITIQUE [SANCTIONS UNDER CONTEMPORARY LAW: PUNISHMENTBETWEEN TECHNIQUE AND POLITICS] 31, 33–34 (C. Chainais & D. Fenouillet,
eds., 2012).
98
Cécile Chénais & Dominique Fenouillet, Le droit contemporain des
sanctions, entre technique et politique [Contemporary Law of Sanctions,
Between Technique and Politics], in LES SANCTIONS EN DROIT
CONTEMPORAIN. LA SANCTION, ENTRE TECHNIQUE ET POLITIQUE [SANCTIONS
UNDER CONTEMPORARY LAW: PUNISHMENT- BETWEEN TECHNIQUE AND
POLITICS] XI, LXXIX, n°88 (C. Chainais & D. Fenouillet, eds., 2012).
99
The symbolic dimension of social and economic interactions was
emphasized by Marcel Mauss in his essay on the gift. There is, of course, an
economic value that is transferred in the gift and counter-gift transactions he
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message addressed to the person sanctioned and, beyond the offender,
to other persons who might be affected by the rule.100 This message
does not aim to change the state of the world, at least not immediately,
but it does aim to change some representations of the world. The
symbolic effect is not necessarily linked to the importance of the
content of the sanction. Thus, a sanction whose content is very light
may nevertheless have a meaning: the fact of being condemned
sometimes is more important than the magnitude of the condemnation.
However, the importance of the sanction can sometimes also be a
message that has a meaning (denunciation function). Even if a sanction
is ultimately not applied (for example, because it cannot be applied, if
the sum to be paid exceeds the financial capacity of the person
sanctioned), the fact that the sanction is heavy is a message from the
sanctioning judge or authority to citizens.101
On the other hand, sanctions may seek to produce effects in
relation to a past situation or in relation to a future situation.102 There
are thus backward-oriented sanctions and forward-oriented
sanctions.103 For example, a sanction may aim to react to a past act.
Since an act is deemed to be wrong because it is contrary to the law, 104
it infringes legally protected interests, or it constitutes a social disorder,
the role of the legal procedure and, ultimately of the sanction, is to
counteract this act, erase its consequences and punish the perpetrator
of the act. The ideal is to be able to restore the status quo disturbed by
the non-compliant act. Sanctioning does not always achieve this ideal
because events are often irreversible, at least partially irreversible. But
describes, but the social significance of this act makes the economic and
material aspect of the transfer a very secondary one. MARCEL MAUSS, ESSAI
SUR LE DON: FORME ET RAISON DE L'ÉCHANGE DANS LES SOCIÉTÉS
ARCHAÏQUES, translated in MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND
FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES, 42-84 (W.D.Halls, trans.,
1990), https://libcom.org/files/Mauss%20-%20The%20Gift.pdf. The concept
of symbolic sanction can be used by scholars when the effectiveness of the
sanctions is doubtful, as it is the case in the field of international economic
sanctions. See Taehee Wang, Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of
Economic Sanctions in the United States, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 787, 788 (2011).
100
Antony R. Duff, Punishment, Retribution and Communication, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 126, 126–27
(Andrew von Hirsh, Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts, eds., 2009).
101
JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 100 (1970).
102
John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith and Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante
Function of Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165, 165–66 (2001).
103
Id.
104
Mekki, supra note 97, at 33.
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an important function of sanctions is to make the response to an offense
as relevant and effective as possible. Restoring the status quo in line
with the law is one way of ensuring the effectiveness of the norm
through an adequate response. Conversely, the purpose of a sanction
may be to prevent the future occurrence of an act contrary to law. In
this case, the relevant sanction is not the one imposed on the perpetrator
of a concrete behavior, but the one that abstractly threatens those who
would break the law. A sanction applied to a particular person for a
past offense may also produce effects in the future for that person (the
aim is to prevent him or her from repeating the offense) or for others
because the sanction imposed is designed to be exemplary.105 The
sanction has a preventive function if it prevents or hinders the future
performance of an offense or if it effectively persuades persons that it
is better not to commit an offense in view of the sanction incurred in
that case.106
The two criteria can be combined, and the different functions
of sanctions can therefore be put into the following matrix.
Effects of the
Sanctions
Backward-oriented
Forward-oriented

Symbolic
Retribution
Rehabilitation
Expressive function
Normative function

Material
Reparation
Confiscatory
Deterrence
Incapacitation

This study will examine these different sub-goals to show
whether, how, and under what specific conditions the sanctions
imposed, or likely to be imposed, by DPAs can contribute to make the
GDPR effective. In particular, this study will consider whether the
sanctions must be effective in order to play their role, whether they
must be heavy in order to be effective, and whether they must be
consistently applied by DPAs in order for the GDPR to be properly
105

Anthony Bottoms and Andrew Von Hirsch make a distinction between
“special deterrence” (“reformation” in Bentham’s wording) and “general
deterrence” (example), for instance. See Anthony Bottoms & Andrew Von
Hirsch, The Crime Preventive Impact of Penal Sanctions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 96, 97 (P. Cane and H. M.
Kritzner, eds., 2010). See also PATRICK MORVAN, CRIMINOLOGIE
[CRIMINOLOGY] 309 (2019).
106
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (1990, Princeton
University Press ed., 2006) (“An instrumental perspective regards compliance
as a form of behavior occurring in response to external factors. It leads to a
focus on the extent and nature of the resources that authorities have for shaping
public behavior [by contrast to a normative perspective studied by the
author].”).
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enforced. First, this study will investigate the retribution and
rehabilitation functions of sanctions (Section A). Then, the
confiscation and reparation functions are detailed (Section B), after
which this study delves into the expressive and normative goals of
sanctions (Section C). Finally, the deterrence and incapacitation
functions of sanctions are analyzed (Section D), before conclusory
remarks on the theory of sanctions (Section E).
A. Retribution and Rehabilitation
This Part of the study investigates the retribution function
(Section 1), prior to studying the rehabilitation function (Section 2).
1. Retribution
The most obvious function of punitive sanctions is that of
retribution.107 The sanction responds prima facie to a request for a
symbolic reaction. An evil has been done; in return, an evil must be
applied to the one who committed the initial evil.108 Punishment is a
response to the transgression. A sanction, regardless of its content, is
therefore first of all an official acknowledgement that an evil has been
committed.109
The retributive compensation may take the form of an
obligation to pay a certain amount of money (fine) or to lose control of
property (confiscation).110 But the sanction can also be immaterial.111
Infamous sanctions or making the sanction public is an accessory or
principal penalty in criminal law, and even more in a regulatory
approach through “publicity order” for instance.112 Such sanctions are

107

Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 24 (2003–2004).
108
Immanuel Kant, The Penal Law and the Law of Pardon, in THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 331 (1999), quoted in Tonry, supra
note 95, at 31.
109
Micheal S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 110 (A. von Hirsch et al.,
eds, 1987).
110
See Jean-Paul Céré & Ludivine Grégoire, Peine (Nature et prononcé), in
REPERTOIRE DE DROIT PENAL ET DE PROCEDURE PENALE (2020).
111
See Golla, supra note 67, at 70 (“Even though immaterial damages such as
loss of reputation due to a mention in an activity report or a high-damage claim
can be more painful for an enterprise in certain cases, technically
administrative fines and criminal penalties are to be regarded as the most
severe sanctions for data protection violations.”).
112
Richard Macrory, New Approaches to Regulatory Sanctions, 20 ENVTL. L.
& MGMT. 210, 212 (2008).
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also provided for in data protection law.113 The regulator may make
public with varying degrees of force the GDPR violation and the
infringement of data subject rights.114 A regulator may thus choose to
display information prominently on its website, communicate to the
media and the public through press releases, or even generate
discussion about a sanction through press interviews.115 When the
entity that is sanctioned is a media, it may be condemned to inform its
users of the sanction that has been imposed on him.116 The more a
company depends on its reputation, the more redoubtable these kinds
of sanctions will be for it.117 Many companies collecting personal data
are strongly impacted by attacks on their image in the users’ eyes.
Companies whose clients are other companies may be less sensitive to
this. Scandals concerning the illegal exploitation of personal data or the
lack of security of sensitive data show the vulnerability of companies

113

GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58 (a) and (b).
The sanction pronounced by the French CNIL against Google is an
illustration of a deliberate decision by the regulatory authority to "make
public." See Deliberation No. SAN-2019-001 of the Restricted Committee of
the CNIL (Jan. 21, 2019) pronouncing a financial sanction against financial
sanction against Google LLC. at 28,
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/san-2019-001.pdf (“The
Restricted Committee of the CNIL, after having deliberated, decides . . . to
make its decision public on the CNIL website and on the Légifrance website,
which will be anonymized upon expiry of a period of two years from its
publication.”).
115
See Golla, supra note 67, at 71 (“Even though immaterial damages such as
loss of reputation due to a mention in an activity report or a high-damage
claim can be more painful for an enterprise in certain cases, technically
administrative fines and criminal penalties are to be regarded as the most
severe sanctions for data protection violations.”).
116
Thierry Kirat, Frédéric Marty, Hugues Bouthinon-Dumas & Amir Rezaee,
Quand dire c’est réguler [When to Say is to Regulate], 25 ÉCONOMIE ET
INSTITUTIONS 3 (2017).
117
In a prior enforcement action regarding Google’s privacy policy, this was
arguably the case. In that instance, the CNIL also pronounced a sanction that
included a publicity element, which required publication of a notice on
Google’s home page. See W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy
Law Developments, 70 BUS. LAW. 253, 255 (2014/2015) (“a decision …
requiring the publication of a communique regarding the fine and data
breaches, as well as linking the decision, for a period of forty-eight
consecutive hours, on its French home page. The publication sanction was
perhaps the most prejudicial (at least from an image standpoint) to Google”)
(citation omitted).
114
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in this respect.118 In view of the retributive function of the sanction,
companies can expect to be sanctioned whenever they violate the
regulation, and the regulatory authorities know it, and they must fear
being sanctioned all the more severely when the breaches are serious.
The application of sanctions according to the logic of the giving and
receiving principle, basically founded on the law of retaliation, is
reinforced by the principle of proportionality included in the European
law about sanctions.119 The requirement laid down in the GDPR, in
particular in its Article 83(1), that penalties must be “effective,
proportionate and dissuasive,” 120 is interpreted most of the time from
a quantitative perspective (that is the material aspect of the penalty):
there must be a relationship between the fault and/or the harm to the
interests of others, on the one hand, and the magnitude of the penalty,
on the other.121 But the requirement of proportionality may also suggest
a symbolic interpretation: an offense must give rise to a sanction in
reaction, just as a donation calls for a counter-gift.122
2. Rehabilitation
The retributive function is linked to the symbolic part of the
rehabilitative function or psychological effect of the sanction.123 The
sanction is not only a message about the wrong act; it also implies
consequences for the way in which the offender and possibly the
victims of the offense (if there are any) are viewed.124 In ordinary
criminal law, particularly in the context of the punishment of offenses
against persons, the rehabilitative function of the victims is

118

Yasmine Agelidis, Protecting the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: “Exposure”
Data Breaches and Suggestions for Coping with Them, 31 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1057, 1069 (2016).
119
Morris J. Fish, An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of
Punishment, 28(1) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 58 (2008).
120
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(1) (“Each supervisory authority shall ensure
that the imposition of administrative fines pursuant to this Article in respect
of infringements of this Regulation referred to in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 shall
in each individual case be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” The cited
paragraphs refer to the levels of administrative fines for various
infringements.).
121
See WP 253, supra note 79, at 6.
122
Mauss, supra note 99, at 50.
123
Mekki, supra note 97, at 48–49.
124
ANTOINE GARAPON, BIEN JUGER: ESSAI SUR LE RITUEL JUDICIAIRE [GOOD
JUDGMENT: ESSAY ON THE JUDICIAL RITUAL] 63–65 (1997). See also MICHEL
FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR [DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON] 14 (1977).

2021]

EU GDPR SANCTIONS

27

important.125 For example, it seems important that the victim of a rape
who might paradoxically feel a sense of guilt should be regarded as a
victim thanks to the punishment.126 Such a consideration may play a
certain role in the field of data protection. It may be important that users
who have had their sensitive data misappropriated as a result of a
breach of data security obligations on the part of the data controller are
told that this harm is not the result of their own negligence but the effect
of a breach of the regulation which for this reason deserves a sanction.
The Ashley Madison case,127 in which a dating platform for extramarital
relationships did not ensure the security of this obviously very sensitive
data128 for the data subjects, illustrates this problem.
The rehabilitative function also concerns the offender.129 Being
punished is seen in classical sentencing theory as a necessary step for
the offender to transform himself or herself to become someone
different from the one who may have committed the offense.130 In
theory, the rehabilitation of the offender, that can be included in the
restorative justice approach, including for white-collar crime,131 does
125
See Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution,
Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 431, 449 (2007).
126
Tyler G. Okimoto & Michael Wenzel, Punishment as Restoration of Group
and Offender Values Following a Transgression: Value Consensus Through
Symbolic Labelling and Offender Reform, 39 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 346, 348
(2008).
127
On the Ashley Madison case, where hackers obtained sensitive data on
users of the site, see Dino Grandoni, Ashley Madison, A Dating Website, Says
Hackers May Have Data on Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 20, 2015),
https://nyti.ms/1Jc7acr.
128
The GDPR category of sensitive data or “special categories of personal
data,” specifically includes “data concerning a natural person’s sex life.”
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 9(1).
129
See Céré & Grégoire, supra note 110, at nos. 8–9.
130
MARC ANCEL, LA DEFENSE SOCIALE NOUVELLE, UN MOUVEMENT DE
POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE HUMANISTE [THE NEW SOCIAL DEFENSE, A HUMANIST
CRIMINAL POLICY MOVEMENT] (1954); PIERRE LALANDE, PUNIR OU
REHABILITER LES CONTREVENANTS ? DU NOTHING WORKS AU WHAT WORKS
(MONTEE, DECLIN ET RETOUR DE L’IDEAL DE REHABILITATION) [PUNISH OR
REHABILITATE OFFENDERS? FROM NOTHING WORKS TO WHAT WORKS (RISE,
DECLINE AND RETURN OF THE REHABILITATION IDEAL)] 30–77, Ministère de
la sécurité publique du Canada (2006).
131
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 125 (1989)
(“Seventeen cases were studied (on the basis of interviews with executives
and other sources) in which corporations had been through adverse publicity
crises. The financial impacts of adverse publicity (on sales, earnings, stock
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not necessarily require a heavy sanction.132 In the field of criminal or
regulatory law that applies to companies, this function of punishment
plays a very limited role.133 The transformation of the company that
violates the GDPR requires more than a symbolic monetary sanction,
as we shall see with regard to the incapacitation function.134
With regard to the retributive and rehabilitative role that
sanctions under the GDPR can play, it can be concluded that, if
breaches of the law can be identified, it is important that they do not
remain unpunished and therefore, that sanctions are effectively and
even systematically applied (at least if other regulatory responses
remained insufficient). As this function is symbolic, it is not necessary
for sanctions to be severe (but sanctions may need to be severe for other
reasons).135 In addition, in order for the functions of retribution and
rehabilitation to be fulfilled, it is important that the sanctions are
properly enforced by all DPAs. If there is a jurisdiction in Europe
where the DPA is reluctant to react to violations or reacts very slowly
compared to other DPAs, this may send the problematic message that
violations go unpunished in that territory. This may logically lead to
companies that tend to be non-compliant to preferentially locate in the
territory of that authority, through what may be described as a form of
forum-shopping. This is the problem that a jurisdiction such as Ireland
could raise, if it appears that it does not apply sanctions, even symbolic
ones, to companies that deserve to be punished.136 As we shall see,
while from a strictly symbolic point of view, light sanctions are more
useful than no sanctions at all, there are other reasons to consider that

prices, etc.) were generally found to be slight; however, nonfinancial impacts
on the loss of repute which executives perceived their company and
themselves to have suffered in the community were found to be important to
them”.). Id. at 124.
132
See GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 148.
133
It is the case as far as fines can be viewed as a “cost of doing business.”
See Leonard Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of
Theory and Scholarship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 516 (1979–1980).
134
See infra Section D.2.
135
Recent developments in criminal policy show that public authorities want
a systematic “criminal response” when offenses are proven, even if there is no
need to apply sanctions in the strict sense. In the French context, see Laura
Aubert, Systématisme pénal et alternatives aux poursuites en France: une
politique pénale en trompe-l'œil [Criminal System and Alternatives to
Prosecution in France: A Criminal Policy in Trompe l'oeil], 74(1) DROIT ET
SOCIETE 17–33 (2010).
136
Joshua Blume, A Contextual Extraterritoriality Analysis of the DPIA and
DPO Provisions in the GDPR, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1425, 1455 (2018).
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light sanctions against powerful actors prevent other functions of
sanctions from being fulfilled.137
B. Confiscation and Reparation
The penalty imposed on the perpetrator of an offense does not
merely serve to declare that an offense has been committed. It can also
be used to repair the situation, or the relationship, disrupted by the
offense. Reparation can be applied to three categories of actors and
refers more specifically to three sub-goals, that this study sets out as
confiscation (Section 1), reparation (Section 2), and a financing
function (Section 3).
1. Confiscation
First, for the offender, reparation consists in removing the
positive consequences that the offense may have generated on his or
her economic situation. The sanction must then result in the deprivation
of the benefit of the offense.138 The financial penalty is convenient to
play this role of confiscation of an illegitimate profit.139 This implies,
for example, that the sanction should be at least as high as the unlawful
profit. This approach is common in other branches of economic
criminal law such as competition law or market abuse law. Sentencing
rules generally take into account the illegitimate profit. For example,
the amount of the benefits derived from the offense is the minimum
amount of the fine or the fine is a multiple of the illicit profit.140 This
137

See infra Sections B.1 (on the confiscation function), B.3 (on the financing
function), C.1 (on the expressive function), and above all D.1 and D.2 (on the
deterrence and incapacitation functions). All of these functions require heavy
penalties imposed on large corporations (such as the U.S. Tech Giants, when
they violate data protection law), virtually or effectively.
138
Claude Ducouloux-Favard, L’amende dans son rapport avec le profit [The
Fine in Relation to Profit], in LA CRIMINALITE D’ARGENT: QUELLE
REPRESSION? [FINANCIAL CRIME: WHAT REPRESSION?]
183, 184 (C.
Ducouloux-Favard & Ch. Lopez, eds., 2004) (explaining that legislation
setting out scales of fines for illegal profit are one of two types: either the
legislator allows fines to exceed the scale’s maximum when the illegal profit
itself exceeds that maximum; or it requires that the fine be at least equal to the
profit derived from the crime).
139
Macrory, supra note 112, at 211.
140
See, e.g., Lianos et al., supra note 92, at 9 (“According to economic theory,
fines should be at least equal to the expected illegally earned profits divided
by the probability to be caught, hence they should relate to expected profits
originating from the violation and not to the profits actually gained that may
be higher or lower than those expected at decision-making time, should the
fines be paid after the period of infringement”).
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approach can be applied in the data area. In today's economy, data have
a high economic value and are the main source of wealth for tech
giants.141 The additional data that could be collected and processed by
companies in violation of the GDPR could bring them additional profit,
which in this case would be illegal.142 The GDPR refers to "financial
benefits" that must be taken into account in determining the amount of
the penalty that the DPA could apply to a non-compliant company.143
2. Reparation
The sanction may theoretically be intended, among other
things, to compensate for the harm suffered by particular victims. It is
clear that this function is not fulfilled by financial sanctions imposed
by DPAs because the amounts to be paid by the sanctioned entity are
not paid to the victims. It is the civil action that provides adequate
compensation to the victims.144 Indeed, this is the main purpose of the
civil liability mechanism.145 The concern to provide victims with
compensation for their losses is not at all absent from the GDPR, but it
is referred to in Article 82146 and not in Article 83, which is devoted to
administrative penalties.147 Regulatory sanctions do not contribute
141

See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 1–7 (“They ensure that efforts of
compliance are undertaken in addition to pure profitability investments and a
fortiori that the economic advantage that controllers or processors derive from
infringements of GDPR, if any, do not remain with them . . .[.[t]he amount of
the fine must be significantly higher than any profit derived from the violation
of the GDPR”).
142
Katharine Kemp, Here’s How Tech Giants Profit from Invading Our
Privacy, and How We Can Start Taking it Back, The Conversation (Aug. 11,
2019 4:03 PM EDT), https://theconversation.com/heres-how-tech-giantsprofit-from-invading-our-privacy-and-how-we-can-start-taking-it-back120078.
143
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2)(k).
144
Id. art. 79(1) (“each data subject shall have the right to an effective judicial
remedy where he or she considers that his or her rights under this Regulation
have been infringed as a result of the processing of his or her personal data in
non-compliance with this Regulation.”).
145
See Jean-Sébastien Borghetti, Les sanctions en droit de la responsabilité
civile [Sanctions in Civil Liability], in LES SANCTIONS EN DROIT
CONTEMPORAIN. LA SANCTION, ENTRE TECHNIQUE ET POLITIQUE [SANCTIONS
UNDER CONTEMPORARY LAW: PUNISHMENT- BETWEEN TECHNIQUE AND
POLITICS] 257, 259 (C. Chainais & D. Fenouillet, eds., 2012).
146
Id. art. 82(1) (“Any person who has suffered material or non-material
damage as a result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right
to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage
suffered.”).
147
Id. art. 83.
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directly to this, even if the importance in duration and number of
persons affected by the infringements are part of the criteria for
determining the administrative penalty.148 The sanction imposed by the
regulator may simply facilitate private enforcement in parallel with the
procedure before the regulatory authority, by facilitating the proof of
the fault of the sanctioned entity.149 In this respect, regulatory financial
sanctions, if they are imposed, whatever the magnitude of the fine,
facilitate private enforcement more than negotiated procedures that
generally preclude admission of guilt.150
3. Financing Function
Thirdly, sanction can be conceived as a means of repairing the
damage caused to the economy or society in general, irrespective of the
particular harm.151 Insofar as the amount of the fines is paid to
collective budgets or to the regulatory authority, sanctions help to
replenish public financial resources that can be used for projects of
general interest (education of citizens, guarantee fund, etc.).152 The
sums collected by way of administrative sanctions, if paid into the
general budget of the Member States, are not specifically earmarked

148
Id. art. 83(2)(a). It may be noted that the damage suffered by the victims is
included as part of the first criterion in the list of elements to be taken into
account.
149
See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 3 (“Private enforcement and actions for
damages, even where special legislation for that purpose exists, play a smaller
role, with the later often being efficient only as a follow on of public
enforcement findings of illegality”).
150
The sanction decision pronounced by a regulatory authority facilitates the
demonstration of a fault entitling the victim to compensation when the
sanctioned violation is the cause of a particular prejudice. This has been
underlined in particular by the European Court of Justice in the field of
competition law (Mar. 9, 1978, Simmenthal, 106/77, Rec. 629, para. 16, and
of June 19, 1990, Factortame and others, Case C-213/89, Rec. I-2433, para.
19). See Robert Saint-Esteben, La reparation d’un préjudice économique
resultant d’infractions au droit de la concurrence, Conference held at the
French Cour de Cassation, n°9,
https://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/pdf_2007/26-04-2007/26-042007_st_esteben.pdf.
151
See Saint-Esteben, supra note 150, at no. 4.
152
See, e.g., the answer of the French Financial Markets Regulator (AMF) to
the question “To whom are the pecuniary penalties imposed by the
Enforcement Committee paid?” Sanctions & transactions: FAQ: La
sanction, AMF, https://www.amf-france.org/fr/sanctions-transactions/faq/lasanction#ancre-62499 (last visited on Oct. 27, 2020).
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for personal data protection policy, but it is a political choice that can
be made by EU Member States.153
Incidentally, sanctions can thus fulfil a funding function.
Sanctions have an objective funding function when the cumulative
amount of sanctions represents a significant financial flow for the State,
EU or regulator's budget. This sanction function is often ignored by the
theorists because it would be inadequate if the financing of public
expenditure or even the functioning of a regulatory authority depended
on sanctions, as this would mean that the normal functioning of
institutions is based on the anticipation of deviant behavior on the part
of regulated people.154 One can note that a good sanction, and therefore
good regulation, meant that sanctions did not have to be applied
because regulated operators comply with the law. When sanctions were
low and few in number, fines were not a significant source of funding
for public institutions. But once the penalties incurred are very severe
and the penalty-imposing authorities no longer hesitate to fine
offending companies hard, penalties become a significant source of
auxiliary funding.155 In the field of competition law, for example, it has
been observed that the cumulative amount of sanctions imposed by the
European Commission has increased by a factor of twenty in 25

153

One way of choosing to earmark the sums collected for personal data
protection policy is to allocate the fines not to the general state budget but to
the budget of the regulatory authorities (if they have budgetary autonomy).
See Julien Lausson, Où va l’argent quand les géants de la tech paient des
amendes? [Where Does the Money Go When Tech Giants Pay Fines?],
NUMERAMA (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.numerama.com/politique/565914ou-va-largent-quand-les-geants-du-net-paient-des-amendes.html.
154
See, e.g., Matt Ford, The Problem With Funding Government Through
Fines, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-problem-withfunding-government-through-fines/389387/.
155
According to the Commission, “Fines imposed on companies found in
breach of EU/EEA antitrust rules are paid into the general EU budget. This
money is not earmarked for particular expenses, but Member States'
contributions to the EU budget for the following year are reduced
accordingly. The fines therefore help to finance the EU and reduce the
burden for taxpayers.” See European Commission Press Release IP/20/1774,
Antitrust: Commission fines car parts suppliers of € 18 million in cartel
settlement (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1774.
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years.156 Some antitrust sanctions exceed €1 billion.157 As multibillion-dollar fines could be imposed on large digital companies,
sanctions in personal data protection law could become an interesting
source of financing for States that are facing significant budgetary
difficulties. This budgetary consideration tends to convince regulators
not to hesitate to impose severe sanctions.158 Thus, DPAs that would
be quick to sanction in order to be the priority beneficiaries of the
amount of the sanctions create the risk of opportunistic use of the power
to sanction, motivated by funding considerations.159 The case of the
sanction pronounced by the French regulator, (CNIL) against Google,
and confirmed by the judge competent to exercise judicial review, the
French Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), may be examined in the light
of this remark.160 However, this creates a perverse incentive because
the amount of the sanctions may be set for reasons other than those

156

According to the European Union, “The EU's sources of income include
contributions from member countries, import duties on products from
outside the EU and fines imposed when businesses fail to comply with EU
rules.” How the EU is Funded, EUROPEAN UNION,
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-budget/revenue-income_en
(last visited on Oct. 27, 2020). See also Matthew Keep, A Guide to EU
Budget, UK House of Commons Briefing paper n°05455, at 3,
file://hecate/myfiles/bouthinondumas/Downloads/SN06455.pdf.
157
See, e.g., Business Insider España, The 7 Biggest Fines the EU Have Ever
Imposed Against Giant Companies, BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2018, 8:11 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.fr/us/the-7-biggest-fines-the-eu-has-everimposed-against-giant-corporations-2018-7.
158
Unless the attraction or retention of foreign companies on the territory of a
Member State is seen as a more important political priority objective than the
replenishment of the State's coffers. The case of the Commission's sanction
against Apple for the taxes that the company should have paid, according to
the Commission (before being contradicted by the Court of First Instance),
shows that Ireland did not seek to take opportunistic advantage of a decision
that potentially brought it more than €13 billion, but made common cause with
Apple to maintain its status as a welcoming territory for US tech giants. See
Eugene Stuart, Whether or Not to Bite the Apple: Some Implications of the August
2016 Commission Decision on Irish Tax Benefits for Apple, 16(2) EUR. STATE AID
L. Q. 209, 229 (2017).
159
David Cowan, Total GDPR Fines Climb to €114m as Companies Struggle
to Comply with Regime, THE GLOBAL LEGAL POST (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.globallegalpost.com/corporate-counsel/total-gdpr-fines-climbto-114m-as-companies-struggle-to-comply-with-regime-67962582/.
160
For a discussion of this case, see infra Part II.
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relating to the effective application of the regulation.161 For this reason,
it seems desirable that the policy for the application of sanctions be
harmonized between the DPAs, in particular to ensure that the remedial
function of sanctions is not misused. The adequate remedy to prevent
the risk of a race towards administrative sanctions to finance the
various EU Member States would be to substitute a sanction procedure
conducted by the European Commission or the EDPB rather than by
the national DPAs, or to allocate the amount of the sanctions imposed
by the regulatory authorities to the EU budget, as is the case with fines
for major anti-competitive practices.162
C. Expressive and Normative Goals
Sanctions play an important role in shaping the mental
representations of individuals and companies, especially expectations
of what might happen to them if they behave this way or that way.163
The main effects of sanctions for the future are prevention and
deterrence. But there is also a future-oriented symbolic effect of
sanctions.164 It corresponds to the expressive or denunciatory function
(Section 1), as well as the normative function of sanctions (Section 2).

161

It was observed that the large fines that some large companies had to pay
represented a quite major contribution to the European budget. See, e.g.,
William Watts, Google’s $2.7 Billion Goes into EU’s Budget — And That’s
More Than Most Member Nations Put it, MarketWatch (June 28, 2017, 2:43
AM ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-googles-27-billion-finestacks-up-against-each-eu-countrys-annual-budget-contribution-2017-06-27.
162
Fines paid to the European budget lead to a reduction in Member States'
contributions in proportion to their participation in the EU budget. See
Antitrust: Commission Fines NBCUniversal €14.3 Million for Restricting
Sales of Film Merchandise Products, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_157
(“Fines
imposed on companies found in breach of EU antitrust rules are paid into the
general EU budget. This money is not earmarked for particular expenses, but
Member States' contributions to the EU budget for the following year are
reduced accordingly.”).
163
Olivier Chassaing, La portée normative des interdictions pénales [The
Normative Scope of Criminal Prohibitions], 93(1) RUE DESCARTES 28, AT NO.
16 (2018) (“La première fonction sociale de la loi pénale est de poser des
modèles de conduites et d’adresser des interdictions pour les citoyens; elle ne
sert à qualifier les situations punissables et à sanctionner les infracteurs que
dans un second temps” [The first social function of criminal law is to lay down
models of conduct and to issue prohibitions for citizens; it only serves to
qualify punishable situations and to punish offenders in a second stage]).
164
See Mekki, supra note 97.
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1. Expressive Function
The mere fact that there is a sanction for transgression and that
this sanction is a punishment, is a means of sending the message that
the rules underlying this sanction are mandatory.165 It promotes the
awareness that these obligations and prohibitions must be complied
with because it is law and more specifically hard law.166 Citizens who
spontaneously respect the legal order (or because they fear the
stigmatizing effect of a criminal conviction for instance)167 will thus be
encouraged to comply with these rules because they know, namely via
the sanctions, that the rules must be applied. This purely symbolic
function of sanctions is, however, unlikely to significantly influence
rational economic actors who tend to weigh costs and benefits related
to compliance and non-compliance, according to the classical
assumptions of Economic Analysis of the Law.168 Besides, the level of
sanctions incurred indicates the importance of these rules and the rights
protected.169
165

The rule is mandatory because it is sanctioned. To take up Henri Motulsky's
concepts see HENRI MOTULSKY, PRINCIPES D’UNE RÉALISATION MÉTHODIQUE
DU DROIT PRIVÉ [Principles of a Methodical Realization of Private Law] 18–
19 (2002) (the rule is composed of two parts: the presupposition or hypothesis
and the effect, i.e. the consequence implied by the hypothesis. If a sanction is
incurred in the event of the performance of a certain conduct, this means that
this conduct is legally prohibited and that it is obligatory not to perform this
act. Similarly, if a sanction is provided for in the event of a breach of an
obligation, this means that the obligation is legally binding!). See Bruno
Oppetit, Henri Motulsky et la philosophie du droit, 38 ARCHIVES DE
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 251, 254 (1993) (Commenting that the rule of law has
a necessarily coercive character and that it implies an at least virtual sanction
and, by its social nature, an external sanction).
166
In environmental law, for instance, the existence of criminal sanctions or
quasi-criminal sanctions is a privileged means of demonstrating the mandatory
nature of the rules imposed in particular by European directives. See MICHAEL
G. FAURE & GÜNTHER HEINE, FINAL REPORT: CRIMINAL PENALTIES IN EU
MEMBER
STATES’
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
333
(2002),
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/criminal_penalties1.pdf.
167
Steven Shavell, Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement 37 J.L. & ECON.
255, 261–62 (1993).
168
Samuel Ferey, Histoire et méthodologie de l’analyse économique du droit
contemporaine [History and Methodology of Economic Analysis of
Contemporary Law], in ANALYSE ÉCONOMIQUE DU DROIT [ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW] 11, 18–20 (B. Deffains & E. Langlais, eds., 2009).
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2014).
169
See Michel van de Kerchove, Les fonctions de la sanction pénale. Entre
droit et philosophie, 127(7) INFORMATIONS SOCIALES 22, 30 (2005)
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Sanctioning has an expressive function (denunciation) because
it underlines the importance that society and the public authorities give
to the values and rights whose violation is sanctioned.170 This
expressive function of punishment has been highlighted by sociologists
such as Emile Durkheim.171 Society shows how precious a value is in
two main ways. The law may provide for a particularly solemn
procedure for the most serious crimes (special courts, intervention of
popular juries, exceptional decorum, etc.).172 The other way of
emphasizing the importance of the protected value is to provide that
the infringement of this right will be severely punished, either through
a feared type of penalty (death penalty, imprisonment, etc.) or through
a high level of punishment (number of years in prison or amount of the
fine).173 The expressive function of the sanction implies that if the
society comes to recognize an important value in the protection of
personal data and respect for the rights of the data subjects, then the
sanctions incurred will logically be high.174 In fact, the sanctions
provided by the GDPR are indeed among the highest financial
sanctions that can be applied in Europe because of the way it is

(explaining that the "socio-pedagogical" or "expressive" function of
punishment may be understood as a symbolic expression of the attachment of
the society to certain norms, the behaviour that conforms to them and the
values that they protect).
170
Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in WHY PUNISH?
HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT DESERVING 111, 114 (Michael
Tonry, ed., 2011).
171
EMILE DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL 82 [THE DIVISION
OF LABOR IN SOCIETY] (1893) (“Nous ne le réprouvons pas parce qu'il est un
crime, mais il est un crime parce que nous le réprouvons”) [We do not
condemn it because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we condemn it].
Thus, sanctions linked to the violations express the values and the collective
consciousness of the society.).
172
The most serious criminal offences are judged by special courts where
particular solemnity is seen. See Garapon, supra note 124, at 54.
173
Even in the case of international criminal law, where there are no guidelines
or scale of penalties, penalties are apportioned according to the seriousness of
the offenses. See Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in
International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 453 (2001)
(“Tribunals have frequently stated the gravity of the offense is the most
important consideration in devising a sentence”).
174
Mira Burri & Rahel Schär, The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework:
Outlining Key Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-Driven Economy,
6 J. INFO. POL’Y 479, 481 (2016) (“It is important to stress at the outset that the
right to privacy is a key concept in EU law and has been given significant
weight that reflects deep cultural values and understandings”).
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calculated.175 It should also be noted that the expressive function of the
sanction does not necessarily imply that it will be actually applied. The
threat of severe punishment could be enough to send a message to the
public that this regulation is considered to be essential.176 However, the
sociology of delinquency also emphasizes that the application of
punishment is a way for society to remind the population of the value
it attributes to protected rights.177 In this perspective, a frequent
application of sanctions will tend to trivialize this set of rules and may
harm the expressive function of the sanction. On the other hand, a
punctual application of the sanction may be useful to affirm that society
does not want to tolerate non-compliance with the law.178 Regulatory
authorities are then inclined to impose exemplary sanctions. Rather
than seeking to sanction many actors, a good policy for the expressive
function of a sanction will be to sanction preferably emblematic
actors.179 From this point of view, large companies that are well known
to the public and the market, such as the U.S. Tech Giants, will be more
exposed to the risk of sanctions than smaller and more banal
companies.180 In addition, if an actor has committed a minor regulatory
violation, the GDPR allows for a reprimand instead of an
175

See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 3 (“The GDPR in its fining system is
inspired by the system of fines in European Competition Law and uses its
methodology in large part. In particular, the determination of fines in terms of
a percentage of overall turnover and a cap of fines determined by a set
percentage of turnover of the undertaking concerned”).
176
However, the sanctions must be known to the people who incur them! See
Robert Apel, Sanctions, Perceptions, and Crime: Implications for Criminal
Deterrence, 29(1) J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 67, 71 (2013) (“deterrence is,
fundamentally, a process of information transmission intended to discourage
law violation”).
177
Jack Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 SOUTHWESTERN SOC.
SCI. Q. 515, 517 (1968).
178
Non-tolerance towards delinquency, even as far as the most minor
infringements are concerned, is linked to the now famous theory of the broken
window. See, generally, G. L. KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES
(1996).
179
See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 1 (“Fines serve to discourage further
infringements. Art. 83 GDPR serves both special prevention and general
prevention, since high fines for misconduct are attracting widespread
attention, especially in the case of controllers or processors known in the
market and to the general public”).
180
On the European Union's tendency to treat large digital companies more
harshly, see, e.g., Javier Espinoza & San Fleming, EU Seeks New Powers to
Penalise Tech Giants, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/7738fdd8-e0c3-4090-8cc9-7d4b53ff3afb.
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administrative fine.181 With regard to the expressive function of
sanctions, it is the sanctions incurred that count, even if the sanctions
that are actually applied may be a useful reminder. The importance of
the quantum of the penalty may enhance the effectiveness of the
communication achieved through sanctions. As this message
complements the regulation itself, decision-making practice must be as
unambiguous as the regulation itself. This argues for a decision-making
practice vis-à-vis the sanctions by the different DPAs as uniform as
possible.182
2. Normative Function
Sanctions can also play a normative function.183 Sanctions not
only help to say that a behavior is mandatory or prohibited, but also to
say in useful detail what precisely is mandatory or prohibited.
Sanctions decisions complement ex post the standards of behavior
provided ex ante by regulation, as if there were a tacit delegation from
the legislator or regulator to the judicial or regulatory authority.184
Clarifications are all the more useful when interpreting and
understanding a law based on abstract and sometimes new standards
with uncertain implications.185 The possible or effective application of
a sanction for having committed a criminal offense is an indirect way
of saying that the conduct in question is prohibited and that people must
therefore positively avoid such conduct.186 When sanctions are
provided to ensure the effectiveness of a regulation, normative rules
181

GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 148 (“In a case of minor infringement . . . a
reprimand may be issued instead of a fine.”).
182
The search for consistency in the implementation of the GDPR is an
explicit goal of the EDPB. See Consistency Findings, EDPB,
https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/consistency-findings_en (last visited
on Oct. 27, 2020).
183
John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante
Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165, 165–66 (2001)
(“The code announces in advance what actions count as criminal; thus the
citizenry can use the announcement to guide their actions to avoid criminal
conduct.”).
184
MARIA JOSE FALCON Y TELLA, CASELAW IN ROMAN, ANGLOSAXON AND
CONTINENTAL LAW 112 (2011).
185
See Wolff, supra note 76, at 11.
186
See Durkheim, supra note 171, at 77 ("Le droit pénal, tout au contraire,
n'édicte que des sanctions, mais il ne dit rien des obligations auxquelles elles
se rapportent. Il ne commande pas de respecter la vie d'autrui, mais de frapper
de mort l'assassin. Il ne dit pas tout d'abord, comme fait le droit civil: Voici le
devoir, mais, tout de suite : Voici la peine. Sans doute, si l'action est punie,
c'est qu'elle est contraire » à une règle obligatoire”).

2021]

EU GDPR SANCTIONS

39

are obviously included in this regulation. The principle of criminal
legality normally even prevents the authority with the power to impose
sanctions from punishing behavior that was not clearly and previously
prohibited.187 As far as regulatory sanctions are concerned, the
principle of criminal legality is not so strict.188
In practice, some of the standards included in the regulations
are sometimes relatively vague and case-law appears useful in
clarifying the rules of behavior resulting from them. However,
violations of regulations that may result in sanctions expose operators
to a legal risk and a risk of sanctions that is high because the sanctions
incurred are high.189 In view of this function, it seems important that
sanction decisions are actually pronounced so that the normative details
are given. The authorities can accentuate this function by echoing the
sanction decisions that feed into case law. In this respect, decisions may
be anonymous because what matters is not the identity of the person
sanctioned.190 In contrast to the functions of sanctions that require
severe penalties (such as deterrence), the amount of the sanctions is of
little importance, since it is the reasoning of the decision that makes it
possible to extract the information useful for the interpretation of the
text. They may even be decisions concluding that the accused person
has been exonerated because the explanation of the reasons why the
accused was not sanctioned may very well be a source of information
on the conduct that is authorized under the regulations.191 For this
normative function of sanctions to play its role properly, it is important
187

Peter Westen, Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 26(3) LAW & PHIL. 229,
305 (2007) (“the rule that criminal statutes be construed narrow”).
188
Case T-99/04, AC Treuhand AG v. Comm’n of the European
Communities (July 8, 2008), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62004TJ0099&from=FR.
189
It is not unusual that companies have to face legal and regulatory
uncertainty. See P.H. Birnbaum, The Choice of Strategic Alternatives Under
Increasing Regulation in High Technology Companies, 27(3) ACAD. MGMT.
J. 489, 492–93 (1984).
190
See Judges’ Technology Advisory Committee (Canadian), Use of Personal
Information in Judgments and Recommended Protocol, March 2005, at no. 21,
https://cjcccm.ca/sites/default/files/documents/2019/news_pub_techissues_UseProtoco
l_2005_en.pdf. Luc Plamondon, Guy Lapalme & Frédéric Pelletier,
Anonymisation de décisions de justice, Conference TALN 2004, at 2
http://transsearch.iro.umontreal.ca/rali/sites/default/files/publis/0UdeM-taln04.pdf.
191
On the merits of a dismissal decision, see, for example, the testimony of
the president of a regulatory authority's sanction body: Daniel Labetoulle, La
Commission des sanctions de l’Autorité des marchés financiers: un
témoignage, 93 DROIT ET SOCIETE, 2016/2, 337, 352.
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that the sanctions taken by the different DPAs are not contradictory and
that they complement each other. Also, with regard to this function, the
uniform application of sanctions must prevail in the European
regulatory style.192
D. Deterrence and Incapacitation
In terms of regulatory sanctions, the function that often appears
to be the most important is the deterrence function (Section 1). The
sanction serves primarily to prevent individuals or companies from
committing infringements in the future. The financial loss that the
offender could suffer in case of sanction is anticipated and taken into
account in his or her economic calculation, so that the violation appears
to him or her to be economically inopportune. Then we will see that
sanctions can also help to prevent the commission of offenses by
impacting not only the anticipations of potential offenders but also on
their means of committing the offenses. In classical criminal law, this
refers to the function of incapacitation (Section 2).
1. Deterrence
From the deterrence perspective, the sanction must be
sufficiently severe in order to play its disciplinary role.193 The right
sanction is the one that is sufficiently dissuasive to encourage operators
to comply strictly with the rules determining how to behave.
Paradoxically, the effectiveness of the sanctions then lies in its ability
not to be applied.194 The economic theory of crime developed from
Gary Becker's seminal article,195 following the pioneering work of
Jeremy Bentham,196 specifies the conditions under which a sanction
can be deterrent. Assuming that the agents are rational, a sanction will
be dissuasive if the anticipated sanction (taking into account the
probability that the offense will be detected, prosecuted and effectively

192

Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of
European Regulatory Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 411,
430 (2011).
193
See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 1.
194
See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985).
195
Gary G. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POLITICAL ECON. 169 (1968).
196
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATIONS, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396 (J. Bowring, ed.,
1838) (1789).
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sanctioned)197 is greater than the anticipated benefit in the case of a
violation of the norm belonging to the criminal law. The economic
analysis of crime also underlines that the deterrent effectiveness of the
sanction will vary according to the risk aversion of the agents.
According to Becker, agents with high risk aversion are deterred more
by severe penalties than by an increase in the probability of
detection.198 Conversely, if they are less risk-adverse, the increase in
the probability of detection will be more effective.199 According to
Beccaria, the certainty and swiftness of the sentence is more important
than its intrinsic severity.200
The GDPR changes both parameters, however. On the one
hand, the penalties incurred are significantly increased; on the other
hand, thanks to the specialization of specific regulatory authorities in
the field of personal data protection with a supervisory role for
companies in this industry, and significant and harmonized
investigation powers (the DPAs), the probability of detecting
regulatory violations is increased.201 In addition, the fact that the rules
and sanctions are common to all EU Member States and that the DPAs
can jointly exercise the power of sanction reduces the likelihood that
companies will escape them by exploiting the diversity of regulations
and the lack of coordination between regulatory authorities.202
197

In another field, see Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and
Perceptions of the Risk of Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 23 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 209 (1989) (stating that in another field, S. Klepper and D. Nagin
emphasize the empirical importance of the perception of detection risk within
a particular social group such as that of administrators on the deterrent effect
of the sanction and on the fear of criminal prosecution).
198
Bruno Deffains, Existe-t-il de bonnes sanctions d’un point de vue
économiques? [Are There Good Sanctions from an Economic Point of View?],
in LES SANCTIONS DES SOCIETES COTEES [SANCTIONS OF LISTED COMPANIES]
53, 75 (Arnaud Reygrobellet & Nathalie Huet, eds., 2012).
199
See Mitchel A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Trade-Off Between
the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880 (1979);
see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions and
Differences in Individuals’ Likelihood of Avoiding Detection, 13 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 217, 223 (1993); see also Nuno Garoupa, Optimal Magnitude and
Probability of Fines, 45 EUR. ECON. REV. 1765, 1765 (2001); see also Jeffrey
Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 297
(1991).
200
CESARE BECCARIA, DEI DELITTI E DELLE PENE [ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT] chs. 19 & 41 (1764).
201
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58.
202
Hugues Bouthinon-Dumas, Economic Analysis of the Interaction Between
National Legal Systems: A Contribution to the Understanding of Legal
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In the field of deterrence, it is the penalties incurred that count
a priori more than the penalties actually imposed.203 Ideally, the mere
potentiality of imposing sanctions is sufficient to persuade those who
might be tempted by the transgression to give up this temptation. But
if transgressions do occur, the fact that they are not sanctioned or not
sanctioned severely enough destroys the credibility of the threat. If
non-compliance, including serious non-compliance, can be observed,
the proper functioning of deterrence requires that sanctions be
effectively imposed and that they be sufficiently severe to update the
deterrent effect, especially because the possibility of a sanction actually
being applied tends to be underestimated by actors as it is a contingent
future event.204 This attitude must be adopted by the different
authorities, and it is therefore again recommended that there should be
a uniform sanctions policy.
2. Incapacitation
Sanctions can also reduce the chances that violations of the law
will occur by acting on the potential perpetrators and their means of
action beyond their expectations.205 Regulators may also be tempted to
impose the very high financial penalties at that may weaken or even
exclude from the market an operator who has violated data protection
regulation.206 This corresponds to the incapacitation function of the
sanction, which is a means of protecting society and the market against

Diversity and Legal Unity, 11 J. CIV. L. STUD. 320 (2018) (“Certain forms of
harmonization such as the establishment of social and economic standards
(e.g., minimal wages, maximum working time) are other ways of overseeing
competition between national systems. In other words, regulatory competition
should be mitigated and circumscribed through state cooperation”).
203
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 6 (1992).
204
Bottoms & Von Hirsch, supra note 105, at 106.
205
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995); Bottoms & Von Hirsch,
supra note 105, at 113 (“Whereas rehabilitation and special deterrence seek to
affect offenders’ choices so they refrain from committing crimes,
incapacitation requires no such change”).
206
See, e.g., Curtis Poe, Is GDPR the New Way to Bankrupt Companies?,
QUORA (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.quora.com/Is-GDPR-the-new-way-tobankrupt-companies (the author of this blog response, who identifies himself
as the CTO of https://allaroundtheworld.fr/, states “the GDPR was created
with the specific intention of levying incredibly punitive fines against
companies for not taking this seriously. And yes, that means driving
companies into bankruptcy for the worst violators of consumer rights”).
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the risk that the sanctioned entity will repeat its harmful behavior.207
The way in which the maximum financial penalties is determined,
based on a high absolute value for small and medium-sized companies
and even more so as a multiple of turnover, makes it possible to fine
almost all companies very heavily.208 This method of calculation is
potentially more severe than calculating sanctions on the basis of
profits or benefits from a reprehensible practice. It makes it possible to
fine companies that, in the cycle of their development, already have
consequential economic activity but are not yet profitable and,
therefore, do not yet generate a profit.
Incapacitation is a traditional objective of criminal law
enforcement. 209 It involves either removing the offender from society
(by imprisonment) or from a particular activity (by banning him from
practicing), or applying a specific sanction aimed at acting on the roots
of his offending behavior. This concern is not necessarily unrelated to
the policy of applying financial sanctions to entities that violate the
GDPR. Admittedly, there are measures other than financial sanctions
that are more directly relevant for ensuring that regulated entities are
in compliance, such as injunctions relating to the obligation to set up
an internal compliance program, as a form of probation for
companies.210 But financial sanctions can indirectly play a role in this
perspective. Indeed, a heavy financial penalty will often have the effect
of bringing about a major change within the company—the company's
strategy and internal organization may be radically reformed following
the sanction, even if this transformation is not the subject of an explicit
injunction from the regulator. It is also not infrequent for the company's
top management to be removed and replaced by new executives to
implement the reformed strategy and incorporate the compliance
requirement lacking. This incentive for the company to reform will be
stronger if the sanctions are more severe. The most severe financial
207

W. Robert Thomas, Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 905 (2019).
208
See infra Part II.C.1. (discussing “wealth-based punishment”).
209
The main application of sentencing theory as a means of preventing crime
(and not just deterring it) concerns pre-trial detention and long prison
sentences or even life sentences, or even the death penalty. See, e.g., Thomas
J. Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment:
Can the Twain Meet?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 122, 122–23 (2012) (“Another explanation is that prison
serves an incapacitation function; that is, it allows the state to detain those
offenders who are expected to commit further harmful acts if released.”).
210
William S. Lofquist, Legislating Organizational Probation: State
Capacity, Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control, 27 LAW. & SOC’Y
REV. 741, 742 (1993).
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sanctions may also result in the company being weakened to the point
of bankruptcy or having to be absorbed by another company. In such
cases, the most severe sanctions (in relation to the economic strength
of the firm) will result in the market foreclosure of the non-compliant
entity.211 The considerable amounts of penalties incurred in relation to
personal data make it possible to imagine such a hypothesis. As the
sanction has a very strong impact on competition, it is essential that the
policy for the application of the GDPR is uniform, so as not to
contribute to introducing distortions of competition between the
sanctioned undertakings and those that might escape sanctions without
this protection being deserved.212 This requirement is particularly
based in EU law on the principle of equal treatment.213
E. Conclusion on the Goals of Sanctions
In view of the objective of preventing infringements of the
GDPR, we note that regulatory sanctions should be imposed whenever
justified, they should be as severe as necessary and they should be
applied in a uniform manner regardless of the jurisdiction where the
proceedings may be initiated.214

211

The anticipation that a very high fine could lead to the weakening or even
bankruptcy of a company is taken into account in competition law. In
competition law, the disappearance of a competitor is rather analyzed as a
perverse effect of a too severe sanction policy. Outside of competition law,
the provoked disappearance of a delinquent firm does not pose the same
problem. See Lianos, supra note 92, at 37 (“excessive fines may lead to the
insolvency of the undertakings to which they have been imposed. This might
not necessarily be a problem, as the risk of insolvency following the
imposition of a fine may have potential deterrence effects. Yet, it may also
lead to negative welfare effects, if it excludes one of the very few competitors
in a market characterized by barriers to entry.”).
212
Uniform application of the sanction policy with respect to companies
operating in the same market is a condition of fairness among competitors. See
Macrory, supra note 93, at 231 (“One of the prime goals of a sanctioning
system should be to ensure that no financial gain or benefit is made from noncompliance, and any economic gains recovered. This is only fair to
competitors who comply with regulatory requirements.”).
213
See Nemitz, supra note 58, at 6 (“The supervisory authorities must comply
with the general principles of law of the European Union and the law of the
Member States, in particular the principle of equal treatment. As a result,
DPAs have a duty to develop an administrative practice for imposing fines in
order to deal with similar cases in a similar way.”).
214
See Yoram Shachar, Sentencing as Art, 25 ISR. L. REV. 638, 653 (1991)
(for a discussion about the multiplicity of purposes and the need for effective
sentences).
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Finally, an analysis of the different goals assigned to the
sanctions that DPAs are likely to impose leads to the conclusion that
the predominant purpose of these sanctions is to make effective the
legal and regulatory framework that DPAs are responsible for
enforcing. In this respect, perhaps the most important sub-goal is
deterrence in the broadest sense of the term, which consists in
threatening regulated entities with sanctions that are sufficiently severe
to convince them to not be tempted by non-compliance. We have
observed, however, that the sub-goals that financial sanctions are likely
to serve are more diverse. As may be deduced from the above, symbolic
sanctions do not necessarily require heavy sanctions to be imposed, but
they still require that sanctions are actually applied when there is a
transgression to remind, clarify and update the message to market
participants. As sanctions often have a material dimension, heavy
sanctions appear to be necessary with regard to powerful players and
to punish the most significant misconduct. Finally, uniform application
is recommended so that most of the functions of sanctions can be
fulfilled.215 Now, this study turns to the specific sanctions provided
under the GDPR, both in the text of the law and in practice.
II.

GDPR SANCTIONS

No sooner had the GDPR become applicable than the first
actions under it were brought by digital rights groups in Europe: among
them, those by NOYB.eu (None of Your Business, or NOYB), a group
created by the Austrian activist Maximilian Schrems,216 and others by
the French organization La Quadrature du Net (LQDN).217 However,

215

See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 5 (“With the entry into force of the
Regulation, data protection authorities must be prepared to sanction
infringements of the Regulation as consistently as possible under the
Regulation, and in order to obtain a strong deterrent against noncompliance.”).
216
See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data
Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 427–29 (2019). See also Henry Farrell
& Abraham Newman, Here's How Europe's Data Privacy Law Could Take
Down Facebook, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018, 7:03 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/25/hereshow-europes-gdpr-may-take-down-facebook/.
217
See Nicholas Vinocur, ‘We Have a Huge Problem’: European Tech
Regulator Despairs Over Lack of Enforcement, POLITICO (Dec. 27, 2019,
5:04
AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/27/europe-gdprtechnology-regulation-089605 (“Another long-waiting party is La Quadrature
du Net, a French digital rights group that filed no fewer than seven lawsuits
against five big tech companies just a few days after GDPR came online.”).
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sanctions were already provided for under the EU DP Directive.218
What is new includes: additional obligations under the GDPR; 219 the
extent of potential administrative sanctions;220 and the powers of the
DPAs.221The GDPR provides for various legal actions for data
protection violations and for sanctions.222
This section begins with a discussion of sanctions and other
actions under the EU DP Directive, then continues with an enumeration
of the kinds of actions and sanctions possible under the GDPR.
A. Sanctions and Other Actions Under the EU DP Directive
The EU DP Directive provided that Member States should
establish sanctions for infringement of its terms: “The Member States
shall adopt suitable measures to ensure the full implementation of the
provisions of this Directive and shall in particular lay down the
sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of the provisions
adopted pursuant to this Directive.”223 It is thus clear that a crucial role
of sanctions that regulatory authorities may impose is to ensure the
effectiveness of a legal framework.224 However, as the EU DP
Directive was a directive and not a regulation, Member States had
significant discretion regarding the form and method of its
implementation in national law.225 This extends to the establishment of
sanctions and the setting of their amounts, as illustrated, for example,
by the contrast between the UK law and that of France: the UK law was
only amended to give its supervisory authority (data protection agency,
or “DPA”) the power to issue sanctions in 2010,226 and then set the
maximum penalty at £500,000,227 a figure that was higher than the
€150,000 maximum established for the French DPA, which was
218

EU DP Directive, supra note 4, art. 24.
See Houser & Voss, supra note 15, at [71]–[95].
220
See id. at [57].
221
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58.
222
Id. arts. 77–84.
223
Id.
224
See, e.g., Neil Gunningham, Enforcement and Compliance Strategies, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 120 (R. Baldwin et al., eds., 2010)
(“Effective enforcement is vital to the successful implementation of social
legislation, and legislation that is not enforced rarely fulfills its social
objectives.”).
225
See W. Gregory Voss, Looking at European Union Data Protection Law
Reform Through a Different Prism: The Proposed EU General Data
Protection Regulation Two Years Later, 17(9) J. INTERNET L. 1, 13 (Mar.
2014).
226
See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8, at 288.
227
Id. at 289.
219
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empowered to issue sanctions by a 2004 amendment to its data
protection act.228 Thus, under the EU DP sanctions were not uniform
among the various Member States and their DPAs,229 whereas
harmonized sanctioning practices is a condition for achieving the goals
of sanctions.230
DPAs were given investigative powers, powers of intervention
(such as ordering a ban on processing, or ordering the erasure or
destruction of data), and the power to engage in legal proceedings for
violation of national implementing legislation.231 Furthermore, judicial
remedies for data protection were afforded to persons for breaches of
their rights,232 and they could seek compensation for damage resulting
from unlawful processing or acts otherwise incompatible with data
protection law.233 However, there was aa divergence among the
Member State DPAs, with those of certain nations—for example,
Germany and Spain—being tough regulators, while those of other
Member States, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, were seen as
228

Loi n° 2004-801 du 6 août 2004 relative à la protection des personnes
physiques à l'égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel et
modifiant la loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux
fichiers et aux libertés [Law No. 2004–801 of Aug. 6, 2004 Relating to the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
Amending Law No. 78–17 of Jan. 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data
Files and Civil Liberties], J.O. du 6 aou. 2004, p. 14063.FRANCE
229
See Jan Philipp Albrecht, How the GDPR Will Change the World, 2(3)
EUR. DATA PROTECT. L. REV. 287, 288 (referring the situation before the
GDPR as one “where 28 different legal systems as well as 28 different judicial
and enforcement cultures define the regulatory environment”),
https://edpl.lexxion.eu/data/article/10073/pdf/edpl_2016_03-005.pdf.
See
also Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection
Regulation: What it is and What it Means, 28(1) INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65,
93 (2019) (referring to the EU DP Directive, the authors state that “the
Directive left fines and other remedies to individual member states. Some
countries implemented the Directive with maximum fines of a couple of
thousand euros – so low to be completely inconsequential to many
businesses.”),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600834.2019.1573501.
230
This is true, for example, regarding the incapacitation function of sanctions,
so as not to distort competition between sanctioned undertakings. See supra
Part I.D.2. This is also true with respect to the retributive and rehabilitative
role of GDPR sanctions. See supra Part I.A.2. Furthermore, such
harmonization of sanctions is desirable for the remedial function. See supra
Part I.B.3.
231
EU DP Directive, supra note 4, art. 28(3).
232
Id. art. 22.
233
Id. art. 23(1).
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more accommodating to business.234 Enforcement powers of DPAs
varied as well depending on applicable law and the individual DPA’s
strategy; although, there was hope that in the European Union, at least,
the GDPR would harmonize powers.235 Obligations were almost
exclusively placed on the data controller,236 and this fact has been seen
as a weakness under national implementing legislation.237
In addition, the publicity created by certain DPAs with respect
to fines issued may be seen as a deterrent in and of itself, perhaps being
at least as important as the actual fines for multinational companies, as
it could be potentially damaging for the company’s reputation in the
eyes of its customers and the public, as we have noticed.238 Moreover,
the amounts of the fines themselves may have been too low to deter
such companies under the EU DP Directive.239 However, overall fines
play a role in awareness-raising and in allowing for there to be a
“business case” for data protection compliance.240 Thus, the
denunciation function and the normative function could be performed
by the fines under the Directive.
B. Kinds of Actions and Sanctions Possible Under the GDPR
Since the adoption of the GDPR much attention has centered
on administrative sanctions issued by the Member State national data
234
See, e.g., WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW
269 (2016) (“Germany and Spain are generally considered more stringent
regulators than the UK or Ireland, for example.”).
235
See David Wright, Enforcing Privacy, in ENFORCING PRIVACY:
REGULATORY, LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES 13, 23–24 (David
Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2016).
236
EU DP Directive, supra note 4, art. 2(d). Various articles provide for the
controller to be responsible for compliance with data protection requirements.
See, e.g., id. art. 6(2) (providing that controllers are to ensure compliance with
data quality principle requirements); Id. arts. 10–11 (providing that in Member
States, the controller or his representative shall provide the data subject with
information regarding the collection of his data); Id. art. 17 (providing that
Member States shall require the controller to implement measures to ensure
the security of data, and be responsible for vetting, with respect to guarantees
in respect of security, any processor who processes data on the controller’s
behalf).
237
See, e.g., GRAHAM J.H. SMITH, INTERNET LAW AND REGULATION (4th ed.
2007) 716–17, (“The [Information] Commissioner may not serve enforcement
notices on data processors and others: this is a weakness in the [Data
Protection Act of 1998].”) (regarding the UK DPA and implementing
legislation).
238
See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8, at 299.
239
Id. at 301.
240
Id. at 304.
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protection agencies for EU data protection law violations.241 However,
that is only one of the tools of the data protection enforcement toolbox:
individuals who are harmed may (1) lodge a complaint with a
supervisory authority,242 (2) bring an action for effective judicial
remedy against a supervisory authority before the courts of Member
State where the supervisory authority is established,243 (3) individually
seek to obtain a judicial remedy against a controller or a processor in
an appropriate jurisdiction,244 or (4) mandate a non-profit publicinterest consumer or digital rights organization to lodge a complaint on
his or her behalf, either with a supervisory authority or a court.245 Each
of these options is discussed below. Note that, in addition to these
options, Member States may specify additional penalties for
infringements which are not subject to administrative fines;246
although, those penalties, to the extent they exist, are beyond the scope
of this study, which is focused on sanctions actually provided in the
GDPR.
1. Actions Before (or by) the Relevant Supervisory
Authority and Its Possible Range of Sanctions
Data subjects have the right to file a complaint with a
supervisory authority for an alleged infringement of data protection law
involving their personal data.247 They may choose the supervisory
authority of their habitual residence, workplace, or place of alleged
241

See, e.g., Olivia Tambou, Lessons From the First Post-GDPR Fines of the
CNIL Against Google LLC, 5 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 80 (2019) (discussing
how the CNIL’s administrative sanction issued to Google “got a great deal of
media attention as well as in the community of 'digital actors'.”). See also
Houser & Voss, supra note 15, at [3] (highlighting the increased
administrative sanctions under the GDPR, “potentially increasing maximum
fines to over $1 billion for a company such as Facebook and over $3 billion
for one such as Google.”); and see Hoofnagle et al., supra note 229, at 93
(speaking to changes to EU data protection as a result of the adoption of the
GDPR, the authors refer to administrative sanctions and state, “changes with
respect to sanctions are the most spectacular.").
242
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 77.
243
Id. art. 78.
244
Id. art. 79.
245
Id. art. 80.
246
Id. art. 84 (discussing that these penalties may be criminal penalties). See
also GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 149 (“Member States should be able to lay
down the rules on criminal penalties for infringements of this Regulation,
including for infringements of national rules adopted pursuant to and within
the limits of this Regulation.”). The references to criminal penalties in Part I
of this study will be relevant for the reader interested in criminal penalties.
247
Id. art. 77(1).
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infringement.248 The relevant supervisory authority must inform the
complainant about the possibility of a judicial remedy, and the progress
and outcome of the complaint.249
With respect to controllers or processors, the Supervisory
Authority has the power to: issue warnings where processing
operations are likely to infringe the GDPR;250 issue reprimands where
processing operations have infringed the GDPR;251 and order
compliance with requests to exercise data subject rights;252 to order the
bringing into compliance of processing operations with the GDPR
(including within a specified manner or period, if appropriate).253 In
addition, it may order a controller to make a data breach notification to
a data subject.254 Furthermore, it may order a temporary or definitive

248

GDPR, supra note 1, art. 77(1).
Id. art. 77(2).
250
Id. art. 58(2)(a); see European Data Protection Board (EDPB), Contribution
of the EDPB to the evaluation of the GDPR under Article 97 (2020), 1, 32.
(stating that the following fourteen countries used this power during the period
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Germany, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania,
Latvia, Malta and the United Kingdom) [hereinafter EDPB].
251
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(b); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 32 (stating
that the following twenty-four countries used this power during the period
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland,
France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia and the United Kingdom).
252
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(c); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 32 (stating
that the following twenty-five countries used this power during the period
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland,
France, Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia).
253
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(d); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating
that the following twenty-seven countries used this power during the period
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland,
France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia and
Slovakia).
254
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(e); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating
that the following ten countries used this power during the period from May
25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Malta, Poland and Latvia).
249
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ban on processing,255 the correction or erasure of personal data,256 the
withdrawal of a data protection certification,257 or the suspension of
cross-border data flows.258 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly for
the purposes of this study, a Supervisory Authority may impose
administrative fines either in place of, or in addition to, other measures
mentioned in this paragraph.259 The amount of these administrative
fines is discussed in Section C.1. Administrative sanctions (other than
administrative fines) help to deter market participants from breaking
the rules and damaging the interests of data subjects. The deterrent
power of these administrative measures, on the one hand, and
administrative fines, on the other hand, is cumulative.260 The graduated
response policy advocated by the GDPR is probably more relevant than
a policy of sanctions, which would have at its disposal only the weapon
of a formidable sanction.

255

GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(f); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating
that the following thirteen countries used this power during the period from
May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Germany, Denmark, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania
and Slovenia).
256
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(g); see EDPB supra note 250, at 33 (stating
that the following seventeen countries used this power during the period from
May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Croatia, Hungary,
Iceland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Norway, Poland and Portugal).
257
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(h); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating
that no country used this power during the period from May 25, 2018 to
November 30, 2019).
258
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(j); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating
that no country used this power during the period from May 25, 2018 to
November 30, 2019).
259
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(i); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating
that the following twenty-two countries used this power during the period
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark (“the legal system of Denmark
does not allow for administrative fines. Fines can only be imposed by the
national courts, which means that the Danish SA reports infringements to the
Police, which then takes the case to court”), Spain, France, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Sweden and Slovakia).
260
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2) (“Administrative fines shall, depending on
the circumstances of each individual case, be imposed in addition to, or instead
of, measures referred to in points (a) to (h) and (j) of Article 58(2).”).
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2. Actions Against the Supervisory Authority
Proceedings against supervisory authorities may be brought
before EU Member State courts where such authorities are
established,261 and they may concern the attempt to obtain an effective
remedy: (i) against a legally-binding decision concerning the
complainant,262 (ii) where the supervisory authority does not handle a
complaint or inform the complainant within three months of the
outcome or progress of it.263 The possibility for market participants to
take legal action against supervisory authorities, and for courts to hear
such cases, is required for an effective judicial remedy and is consistent
with the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s Convention
108, and to the modernized version of that Convention.264
In addition to having the possibility of lodging a complaint
with a supervisory authority, a data subject may also seek effective
relief against a controller or processor in the courts (the actions are
without prejudice to one another).265 This would be the case where the
data subject considers that his or her rights under the GDPR have been
infringed by non-compliant processing of his or her personal data.266
There are alternative possible jurisdictions for the case: the courts of
the EU Member State, (i) where the controller or the processor, as the
case may be, has an establishment, or (ii) of the data subject’s habitual
residence, unless the defendant is “a public authority of a Member State
acting in the exercise of its public powers.”267 If a competent court of
an EU Member State knows of proceedings on the same matter
involving data processing by the same controller or processor, as the
case may be, it contacts the other court to confirm the existence of such
proceedings,268 and any court other than the one where the case is first
brought may suspend proceedings.269 In a similar manner, any court
other than the one where the case is first brought may decline

261

Id. art. 78(3).
Id. art. 78(1).
263
Id. art. 78(2).
264
See Waltraut Kotschy, Article 78. Right to an Effective Judicial Remedy
Against a Supervisory Authority, in THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION
REGULATION (GDPR): A COMMENTARY 1125, 1127–28 (Christopher Kuner
et al., 2020).
265
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
266
Id.
267
Id. art. 79(2).
268
Id. art. 81(1).
269
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 81(2).
262
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jurisdiction upon application of one of the parties, if the first court has
jurisdiction and its law permits consolidation of the claims.270
The claimant, who may be the data subject or another injured
party,271 has the right to compensation from the controller or the
processor, as the case may be, if he or she has suffered damage
(whether material or non-material) because of infringement of the
GDPR.272 Such damage may be financial, physical or psychological.273
Controllers are liable for damage caused by processing that infringes
the GDPR, if they are involved in processing. Processors, on the other
hand, are only liable for damage related to non-compliance of
obligations specifically addressed to processors in the GDPR, or where
they have acted against the relevant controller’s lawful instructions.274
In both cases, there may be an exemption from liability if the controller
or processor, as the case may be, proves that “it is not in any way
responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.”275 Where there are
joint controllers or processors or both controller and processor are
involved in the processing that causes the damage, each shall be held
liable for the entire damage276 and the one who pays the full
compensation is entitled to claim back a share (based on their relative
parts of responsibility) from the other controller or processor involved
in the proceeding.277 As a result of this potential for joint liability,
processing agreements, whether in the context of joint controllers or
the more traditional relationship between a controller and a processor,
should clearly set out the responsibilities of each party, as indicated by
Articles 26 and 28 of the GDPR, and this should include
responsibilities for eventual claims.278 However, France, for one, has
added the possibility of class action law suits for data protection

270

Id. art. 81(3).
See Heledd Lloyd-James & Peter Carey, The Rights of Individuals, in DATA
PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UK AND EU LAW 122, 152 (Peter Carey,
ed., 5th ed., 2018) (“It is not necessary for the claimant to be the data subject
in relation to the relevant processing.”).
272
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 82(1).
273
See Lloyd-James & Carey, supra note 271, at 152 (“Claims for
compensation may be brought for financial, physical, and psychological
damage as well as for distress caused by an infringement of the GDPR.”).
274
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 82(2).
275
Id. art. 82(3).
276
Id. art. 82(4).
277
Id. art. 82(5).
278
See Lloyd-James & Carey, supra note 271, at 151–52.
271
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violations,279 and the GDPR has included actions by non-profit
organizations mandated by individuals, as this study will now discuss.
In the case of the GDPR, such measure is intended to make easier and
enhance the defense of data subject interests,280 thus facilitating
reparation. This is useful since we noted that the reparation function
was not directly fulfilled by administrative fines.
3. Actions by Non-Profit Organizations Mandated
by Individuals
Procedural rules relating to private enforcement certainly have
a potential effect on the effectiveness of regulation: the easier it is to
initiate legal proceedings and the more open they are to a large number
of potential claimants, including activist NGOs, the more likely it is
that regulations and rights will be respected.281 Concern for effective
regulation would be served not only by financial penalties as a deterrent
to transgressing the applicable standards, but also by private
enforcement actions.
Under the GDPR, a data subject may mandate a non-for-profit
body, organization or association, properly organized under the law of
an EU Member State, whose purpose is in the public interest, and that
is active in protection of data subject rights and freedoms regarding the
processing of their personal data, to file a complaint, to apply to a court
for relief against a supervisory authority, or to seek an effective remedy
against a controller or processor on its behalf.282 Furthermore, EU
Member States may grant to such bodies, organizations or associations
to take such actions independent of any mandate, if it considers that
data subject rights under the GDPR have been infringed.283 While the
European Commission acknowledges that several actions were started
by NGOs mandated by individuals, it commented that “recourse to
representative actions would have been easier if more Member States
had made use of the possibility provided for by the Regulation to allow
non-governmental organisations to launch actions without a
279

Loi 2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice du
XXIe siècle [Law No. 2016-1547 of Nov. 18, 2016 to Modernize XXIst
Century Justice], J.O. du 19 nov. 2016, p. 269.
280
See Gloria González Fuster, Article 80. Representation of Data Subjects,
in THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR): A
COMMENTARY 1142, 1143 (Christopher Kuner et al., 2020).
281
See, e.g., Federica Casarosa, Transnational Collective Actions for CrossBorder Data Protection Violations, 9(3) INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2020)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/224938/1/1733852298.pdf.
282
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 80(1).
283
Id. art. 80(2).
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mandate.”284 Since private enforcement techniques are available in
different ways in the EU Member States, it appears that deterrence
through administrative fines remains the minimum basic mechanism to
ensure effective regulation. Private enforcement appears to be a
complementary, and not a generalized mechanism.
However, the Commission has proposed a new Directive on
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of
consumers,285 which is intended to apply to data protection, among
other areas.286 This proposed Directive is in the legislative process and,
on March 26, 2019, an amended version of the proposed Directive was
approved by the Parliament on first reading, but, as of July 30, 2020,
the legislative text still awaits the Council’s first reading position.287
The proposed Directive, if adopted in the form proposed by the
Commission, would enable “qualified entities to seek representative
actions aimed at the protection of consumers, while ensuring
appropriate safeguards to avoid abusive litigation.”288 It would also
allow for redress measures, including those for compensation,289 and
EU Member States would be able to provide, alternatively, for courts
or administrative authorities to issue declaratory decisions with respect
to listed EU legislation “regarding the liability of the trader toward the
consumers harmed by an infringement . . . in duly justified cases where,
due to the characteristics of individual harm to the consumers
concerned the quantification of individual redress is complex,”290 with
284

Communication from Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, Data Protection Rules as a Trust-Enabler in the EU and Beyond –
Taking Stock, at 7, COM (2019) 374 final (July 24, 2019).
285
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective Interests of
Consumers, and Repealing Directive, COM (2018) 184 final (Apr. 11, 2018).
286
Id. recital (6) at 19; see Annexes to the Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Representative Actions for the
Protection of the Collective Interest of Consumers, and Repealing Directive
2009/22/EC, at 5, COM (2018) 184 final (Apr. 11, 2018), (illustrating the
GDPR figures on the list of EU legislation to be covered by the proposed
Directive).
287
See Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective Interests of
Consumers,
PARL.
EUR.
DOC.
(COD
0089)
(2018),
https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?referen
ce=2018/0089(COD)&l=en (last visited on July 30, 2020).
288
Proposal for a Directive, supra note 285, art. 1(1) at 26.
289
Id. art. 6(1) at 28.
290
Id. art. 6(2) at 28; see Internet, New Technologies, and Value, supra note
14, at 482–84 (explaining that the quantification of redress for personal data
is famously complex, as there is a lack of transparency on the part of the U.S.
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certain exceptions.291 Importantly, the proposed Directive provides for
cross-border representative actions:
Member States shall ensure that where the
infringement affects or is likely to affect consumers
from different Member States the representative action
may be brought to the competent court or
administrative authority of a Member State by several
qualified entities from different Member States, acting
jointly or represented by a single qualified entity, for
the protection of the collective interest of consumers
from different Member States.292
This move toward collective redress (CR) is part of an evolution of EU
law from a focus on institutions or individuals taking action to
collective action, which has specifically been called for in the areas of
“consumer protection, competition, environment protection, protection
of personal data, financial services legislation and investor
protection.”293
Having presented the sanctions other than the administrative
fines, it appears that the competition between types of sanctions or legal
actions does not undermine the specific effectiveness of administrative
sanctions in terms of the objectives we have listed. On the contrary, the
different types of sanctions complement each other, either because
administrative fines do not achieve certain goals (e.g., reparation for
victims) or because other sanctions actually increase the effectiveness
of administrative fines (e.g., the regulator's injunctions which both
precede and are secured by the fines).
C. The Quantum of Administrative Sanctions
The quantum of administrative sanctions imposed on violators
of data protection law is the subject of this Section, as well as the
subject of many commentators on the GDPR. This study will start this
Tech. Giants regarding their value, and there is also a “collective effect of
cumulated data,” making them more valuable collectively than cumulatively.
This all argues for collective redress).
291
Proposal for a Directive, supra note 285, art. 6(3) at 28–29.
292
Id. art. 16(2) at 32.
293
Sara Benedi Lahuerta, Enforcing EU Equality Law Through Collective
Redress: Lagging Behind?, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 783, 792 (2018) (“EU
law has, therefore, evolved from its initial focus on institutional and individual
vigilance to recognize, more recently, that collective vigilance, particularly
CR and broader standing rules, are necessary to make the enforcement toolkit
more comprehensive and effective.”) (citation omitted).

2021]

EU GDPR SANCTIONS

57

subject by detailing the relevant text of the GDPR and its development
(Section 1), then will explain the “one-stop-shop” mechanism (Section
2), before comparing sanctions prior to the GDPR to those after its
application date (Section 2).
1. The Text of the GDPR and Its Development
The text of the GDPR was developed over a period that began
well before the eventual application of the legislation in May 2018. In
the European Commission’s initial proposal of the GDPR, which was
released on January 25, 2012, a proposed Article 79 aimed to empower
DPAs to impose administrative sanctions that were to be “in each
individual case effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”294 This
language regarding sanctions was retained in the final version of the
GDPR.295 The goal was to be achieved in the context of what was to be
strong enforcement of the data protection rules.296 Implementation was
expected to lead to, in the Commission’s analysis, “consistency of data
protection enforcement in the Union, the effective possibility of
individuals to exercise their data protection rights to the protection of
personal data within the EU and the efficiency of data protection
supervision and enforcement.”297
The initial Commission proposal for the GDPR gave DPAs the
power to sanction administrative offenses,298 and provided that
administrative sanctions should go on a sliding scale, from mere
warnings, to a first level of €250,000 or 0.5% of annual worldwide
turnover for an “enterprise,” to a second level of €500,000 or 1% of
annual worldwide turnover, and to a third, highest level of €1 million
or 2% of annual worldwide turnover, in the most serious cases.299 The
position of the European Union Parliament in first reading in 2014,
provided, in addition to the range of sanctions mentioned above, the

294

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection
Regulation), art. 79, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012).
295
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(1).
296
Proposal for a Regulation, supra note 294, at 2 (“[I]t is time to build a
stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the EU, backed by
strong enforcement that will allow the digital economy to develop across the
internal market, put individuals in control of their own data and reinforce legal
and practical certainty for economic operators and public authorities.”)
(emphasis added).
297
Id. at 5.
298
Id. art. 53(4).
299
Id. art. 79.
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possibility of requiring “regular periodic data protection audits.”300
Furthermore, the Parliament rejected the sliding scale approach and
increased the maximum level of administrative fines up to €100 million
or 5% of annual worldwide turnover in the case of an enterprise.301 This
relatively radical change in fines must be seen in the context of the
Edward Snowden revelations about the cooperation of U.S. Tech
Giants in NSA mass surveillance programs, which were brought to the
attention of the general public through the press less than one year
earlier.302 Following the trialogue negotiations among the Council, the
Commission and the Parliament, the GDPR provision was modified
and a two-level set of fines was adopted.
As finally provided in the GDPR, the level of administrative
sanctions may vary on a case-to-case basis, depending on the
circumstances, including compliance measures taken.303 Furthermore,
sanctions will differ depending on whether the controller or processor,
as applicable, is an undertaking or not. An “undertaking” is a term used
throughout the GDPR, but without definition.304 It should be read to
be an enterprise involved in economic activity and will often act as a
legal person (or corporate entity).305 A company (or corporation)
involved in economic activity would be an undertaking. The term
“enterprise” is defined as “a natural or legal person engaged in an
economic activity, irrespective of its legal form, including partnerships
or associations regularly engaged in an economic activity.”306
Infringements of different categories of obligations may lead
to different levels of sanctions, from up to €10 million or €20 million,
in the case that the controller or processor is not an undertaking, and
300

Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data,
(COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)) (Ordinary legislative
procedure: first reading), art. 79(2a)(b).
301
Id. art. 79(2a)(c).
302
For a discussion of the impact of the NSA revelations on the GDPR
legislative process, see W. Gregory Voss, Looking at European Union Data
Protection Law Reform Through a Different Prism: The Proposed EU
General Data Protection Regulation Two Years Later, 17 J. INTERNET L. 1,
19–21 (2014).
303
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2).
304
However, the term “group of undertakings” is defined and means: “a
controlling undertaking and its controlled undertakings.” Id. art. 4(19).
Obviously, this does not help us with the definition of “undertaking.”
305
In recital 14 we learn that undertakings may be established as legal persons.
Id. recital 14. More importantly, in recital 110 we see that “group of
undertakings” may be synonymous with “group of enterprises engaged in a
joint economic activity.” Id. recital 110.
306
Id. art. 4(18).
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up to the greater of whichever of such sums is applicable to its category
and 2% or 4% of total worldwide annual turnover for preceding
financial year, depending on the category, in the case of an undertaking.
The two categories of provisions set out in Article 83 of the GDPR may
be broken down into those the infringement of which is less serious,
and those the infringement of which are more serious. The less serious
include infringement of provisions centered around complianceensuring obligations, including specific security obligations.307 The
more serious include infringement of provisions centered around basic
obligations to process data, and data subjects’ rights.308
Perhaps what is most notable about this, in addition to the
potential quantum of the fines, is that the GDPR embraces what has
been described as “wealth-based punishment,” which Professors
Rustad and Koenig claim is a U.S. innovation,309 not traditionally
levied in the European Union.310 Rustad and Koenig do, however,
recognize the large amounts of wealth-based fines imposed by the
European Commission for EU competition law violations.311 In cases
of an illegal cartel or abuse of a dominant position, fines may go up to
a maximum of ten percent of total turnover of the undertaking or the
association of undertakings in the preceding business year,312 or up to
two and one-half times the maximum amount under the GDPR.
Through their mutual adoption of wealth-based punishment, the
GDPR’s tie to one area of economic law—competition law—is
recognized.
The sanctioning power conferred on DPAs is part of the more
general trend of European law to strengthen sanctions serving a more
effective market regulation.313 A set of common rules at European level
307

Id. art. 83(4).
Id. art. 83(5).
309
See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data
Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 369, 431 (2019) (where the authors
claim that the GDPR’s fines are “[s]imilar to U.S. punitive damages,” in that
they are imposed “based upon the wrongdoer’s annual turnover.”) Id. at 431.
310
Id. at 429.
311
Id. at 429–31 (citing the July 2018, $5.1 billion fine against Google, the
May 2009, €1.06 billion fine against Intel, and the September 2017, €2.2
billion fine against Google).
312
Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 23(2), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 17.
313
One note focuses on “an observable intersection of data protection and
competition law to create a more efficient regulatory environment with the
goal of offering consumers the best protection for their personal data at the
least cost for the companies storing and processing that data,” which should
be the goal of such trend. See Olivia Altmayer, The Tipping Point –
308
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on sanctions is gradually being developed. The standard of "effective,
dissuasive and proportionate" sanctions is present in different
regulations and its understanding in the field of data protection law can
therefore be inspired by its application in other areas, such as
competition law or market abuse law. The power of sanctions in data
protection law has been presented as a revolution, but it may also
appear as the effect of a convergence between the different European
regulations on sanctions.
2. The One-Stop Shop Mechanism
A “one-stop shop” (OSS) mechanism has been provided in the
GDPR, whereby, when a data controller has more than one
establishment in the European Union (actually the EEA), and there is
cross-border processing of personal data, the DPA of the main
establishment has the competence to act as “lead supervisory authority”
for such cross-border processing.314 The term “main establishment” is
defined as follows:
(a) as regards a controller with establishments in more
than one Member State, the place of its central
administration in the Union, unless the decisions on
the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data are taken in another establishment of the
controller in the Union and the latter establishment has
the power to have such decisions implemented, in
which case the establishment having taken such
decision is to be considered to be the main
establishment;
(b) as regards a processor with establishments in more
than one Member State, the place of its central
administration in the Union, or, if the processor has no
central administration in the Union, the establishment
of the processor in the Union where the main
processing activities in the context of the activities of
an establishment of the processor take place to the
Reevaluating the ASNEF-EQUIFAX Separation of Competition of Data
Privacy Law in the Wake of the 2017 Equifax Data Breach, 39 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 37, 40 (2018).
314
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 56(1) (“Without prejudice to Article 55, the
supervisory authority of the main establishment or of the single establishment
of the controller or processor shall be competent to act as lead supervisory
authority for the cross-border processing carried out by that controller or
processor in accordance with the procedure provided in Article 60.”).
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extent that the processor is subject to specific
obligations under this Regulation[.]315
The term “place of its central administration” is not defined in the
GDPR but may be seen as the place out of which the company is
actually run, where the main decisions are made, usually corresponding
to the operational headquarters.316 Yet, cases may exist “where an
establishment other than the place of central administration makes
autonomous decisions concerning the purposes and means of a specific
processing activity” where there could be more than one lead DPA.317
In this context, “cross-border processing” means either
“processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the
activities of the establishment in more than one Member State of a
controller or processor in the Union where the controller or processor
is established in more than one Member State”318 or “processing of
personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of a
single establishment of a controller or processor in the Union but which
substantially affects or is likely to substantially affect data subjects in
more than one Member State.”319 In other words, there is an element of
internationality either through the places where processing takes place
in the context of a controller’s or processor’s establishments’ activities,
or where there is a single establishment but their processing affects data
subjects in different EU Member States. Additionally, the DPA, who
has the lead role, may change if there is the relocation of a company’s
main establishment to another EEA Member State, and if there is an
ongoing procedure involving that company. This would “deprive the
first authority of its original competence at the moment such a change
becomes effective, but not to retrospectively deprive the operations

315

Id. art. 4(16).
See Luca Tosoni, Article 4(16). Main establishment, in THE EU GENERAL
DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR): A COMMENTARY 225, 230
(Christopher Kuner et al. eds., 2020).
317
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines for identifying a
controller or processor’s lead supervisory authority, WP 244 rev.01, adopted
on Dec. 13, 2016, as last revised and adopted on Apr. 5, 2017 [hereinafter WP
244] (this would be the case, “where a multinational company decides to have
separate decision making centres, in different countries, for different
processing activities.”). These Guidelines were endorsed by the EDPB when
it came into existence and replaced the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party on May 25, 2018. European Data Protection Board, Endorsement
1/2018, at 2 (May 25, 2018).
318
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(23)(a).
319
Id. art. 4(23)(b).
316
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already carried out by the initial authority of a legal basis.”320 Thus, the
DPA of the new Member State where the main establishment is located
would become the lead DPA.
However, despite this competence of the lead DPA, each DPA
may handle complaints brought to it or possible GDPR violations if
related only to the establishment in its Member State or where it
substantially only affects data subjects there,321 after having informed
the lead supervisory authority,322 where the lead supervisory authority
does not decide to handle the case, subject to procedures of mutual
assistance and joint operations between the DPAs.323 Where the lead
supervisory authority decides to handle the case, the procedure for
cooperation between itself and the other “supervisory authorities
concerned” shall apply.324 In any case, the lead DPA is “the sole
interlocutor of the controller or processor for the cross-border
processing carried out by that controller or processor,”325 although it
has been suggested that this does not mean that the lead DPA must be
their sole contact point.326 Furthermore, there is a consistency
mechanism set up under the GDPR,327 in which the EDPB takes a key
320

European Data Protection Board, Opinion 8/2019, at 8 (July 9, 2019) (On
the competence of a supervisory authority in case of a change in circumstances
relating to the main or single establishment).
321
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 56(2) (“By derogation from paragraph 1, each
supervisory authority shall be competent to handle a complaint lodged with it
or a possible infringement of this Regulation, if the subject matter relates only
to an establishment in its Member State or substantially affects data subjects
only in its Member State.”).
322
Id. art. 56(3).
323
Id. art. 56(5).
324
Id. art. 56(4) (the cooperation procedure is set out in Article 60 of the
GDPR). “Supervisory authority concerned” is defined as “a supervisory
authority which is concerned by the processing of personal data because: (a)
the controller or processor is established on the territory of the Member State
of that supervisory authority; (b) data subjects residing in the Member State
of that supervisory authority are substantially affected or likely to be
substantially affected by the processing; or (c) a complaint has been lodged
with that supervisory authority.” Id. art. 4(22).
325
Id. art. 56(6).
326
HIELKE HIJMANS, Article Commentary, Art. 56 Competence of the Lead
Supervisory Authority, THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION
(GDPR): A COMMENTARY 913, 924 (Christopher Kuner et al. eds., 2020)
(“This does not mean that the lead DPA must always operate as the sole
contact point of the local DPA. In view of the strong position of the local DPA
on substance, as described, it would be illogical to preclude the local DPA
from interacting with the controller or processor.”).
327
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 63.
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role through, for example, issuing opinions328 or adopting binding
decisions to resolve disputes.329
As a result of this OSS mechanism, the sanctioning power of
the supervisory authorities is exercised on a national (or Member State)
level, through Member State DPAs,330 whether they be lead
supervisory authorities or supervisory authorities concerned, albeit
with a coherency mechanism headed up by the EDPB. This may be
seen to go against the trend for enforcement more generally in the
European Union, which is a move of enforcement powers from the
Member States to the European Union.331 This trend is illustrated, for
example, by changes in the supervisory competence of large financial
institutions. In the past, credit institutions in the Member States were
regulated by national supervisory authorities, irrespective of their size.
Today, the main European banking groups are mainly placed under the
supervision of the European Central Bank, which has, inter alia, the
power to impose administrative sanctions (up to 10 % of the total
annual turnover).332 It may be argued that the fact that administrative
sanctions under the GDPR are handled at the Member State level,
through national DPAs, especially when the position of Ireland is
considered, is the root of difficulties for the enforcement of the GDPR,
as discussed in Section 3 below.
3. Comparison with Sanctions
Application of the GDPR

Prior

to

the

Immediately prior to the application of the GDPR, maximum
fines under Member State national law implementing the EU DP
Directive did not generally exceed hundreds of thousands of euros. For
example, in Germany the maximum was €300,000; in the United
Kingdom, it was £500,000 or roughly €580,000; in Sweden, one
million crowns or roughly €105,000; in Ireland €100,000; in Italy,

328

Id. art. 64.
Id. art. 65.
330
See Commission Decision of June 27, 2017, supra note 51 (Provides a
definition of “supervisory authority.” This study uses the abbreviation DPA
for “supervisory authority” as well).
331
See Scholten et al., supra note 66, at 6 (“[ . . . ] a clear trend has emerged
where enforcement powers that were once in the hands of the MS have been
transferred to the EU”).
332
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to
the prudential supervision of credit institutions, art. 18 (2013).
329
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€300,000; in the Netherlands, €820,000 or 10% of turnover; in
Romania €22,000 or 2% of turnover; and in France €3,000,000.333
After the application of the GDPR, on March 14, 2019, the
Dutch DPA—Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens—published a fining
structure for GDPR violations and those of the Netherland’s
implementing act for the GDPR, introducing four fine categories with
fine ranges extending from €0-€200,000 to €450,000-€1 million and
default fine rates ranging from €100,000 to €725,000.334 Although
these rates differ from the GDPR rates (and indeed are much lower than
those in the GDPR335), the Dutch DPA may vary its fines from the
default rates based on mitigating or aggravating factors and may still
fine up to the maximum fine rates set out in the GDPR.336 This
highlights the principle that fines must at the same time dissuade, be
effective and not be disproportionate, so that the circumstances of each
case must be evaluated before establishing the fine, but it also may be
sending a clear message that “fines are coming!”337 If the EDPB were
to decide to publication guidelines for the calculation of GDPR fines,
however, the Dutch DPA might withdraw its guidelines.338
While the first six months to one year following the first date
of application of the GDPR seemed to be a relative “cease-fire,” this
changed with a first multimillion euro fine by the French DPA against

333

See BART CUSTERS ET AL., EU PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN POLICY
PRACTICE 228 (2019). Note that, in France’s case, maximum fines had
been €150,000 for first offenses until adoption of the GDPR, but during the
period between the GDPR’s adoption and its application this was changed by
the Loi pour une République numérique (Digital Republic Act) of October 7,
2016, which increased maximum fines to €3,000,000, thus anticipating higher
fines under the GDPR. See CNIL, Ce que change la loi pour une République
numérique pour la protection des données personnelles [What the Digital
Republic Act Changes for the Protection of Personal Data] (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.cnil.fr/fr/ce-que-change-la-loi-pour-une-republique-numeriquepour-la-protection-des-donnees-personnelles.
334
Steenbruggen et al., Dutch Regulator Publishes Guidelines for the
Calculation of Administrative Fines Under the GDPR, BIRD & BIRD (Apr.
2019), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2019/netherlands/dutchregulators-publishes-guidelines-for-the-calculation-of-administrative-finesunder-the-gdpr.20.
335
Id.
336
Id.
337
Id. (the authors suggest that if the EDPB decides to publish guidelines for
the calculation of GDPR fines, the Dutch DPA might withdraw its guidelines).
338
Id.
AND
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Google in January 2019.339 While only amounting to 0.05 % of revenue
for Google’s parent, Alphabet, for the year 2017,340 such fine for
violations of the obligations of transparency and information, and for
lack of a legal basis for ads personalization data processing is, as of
October 31, 2020, the largest fine issued under the GDPR. However,
more spectacularly, in July 2019, the United Kingdom’s DPA—the
ICO—announced intentions to fine British Airways £183.39 million341
and Marriott International more than £99 million,342 both in connection
with data breaches. However, the British Airways fine was eventually
lowered to £20 million,343 and the Marriott International figure was
finally reduced to £18.4 million.344 As of October 31, 2020, fourteen
fines of over €1 million have been assessed by an EU or EEA DPA
since the GDPR has applied: (i) Google LLC (France), €50,000,000;
(ii) Hennes & Mauritz Online Shop A.B. & Co. KG (Germany),
€35,258,708; (iii) TIM (Italy), €27,800,000; (iv) British Airways
(United Kindgom), €22,046,000; (v) Marriot International,
€20,450,000; (vi) Austrian Post (Austria), €18,000,000; (vii) Wind Tre
S.p.A. (Italy), €16,700,000; (viii) Deutsche Wohnen SE (Germany),
339

The CNIL’s Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50
Million Euros Against GOOGLE LLC, CNIL (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-financial-penalty50-million-euros-against-google-llc (the fine amounted to €50 million and
was appealed, unsuccessfully, by Google).
340
The CNIL converted the 2017 revenue of Alphabet—$109.7 billion—into
the figure of roughly €96 billion. See Commission Nationale de
l'Informatique et des Libertés, Délibération n°SAN-2019-001 du 21 janvier
2019,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCnil.do?oldAction=rechExpCnil&id=C
NILTEXT000038032552&fastReqId=2103387945&fastPos=1 (Fr.).
Dividing the amount of the fine by this revenue figure yields roughly 0.05%.
Note that the sanction was upheld on appeal by the Council of State (CE 19
June 2019, req. n° 430810), https://www.conseiletat.fr/fr/arianeweb/CE/decision/2020-06-19/430810.
341
Intention to Fine British Airways £183.39m Under GDPR for Data Breach,
ICO (July 8, 2019), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/newsand-blogs/2019/07/ico-announces-intention-to-fine-british-airways/.
342
Intention to Fine Marriott International, Inc More than £99 Million Under
GDPR for Data Breach, ICO (July 9, 2019), https://ico.org.uk/about-theico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/07/intention-to-fine-marriottinternational-inc-more-than-99-million-under-gdpr-for-data-breach/.
343
British Airways, ICO (Oct. 16, 2020), https://ico.org.uk/action-wevetaken/enforcement/british-airways/.
344
Marriott International Inc, ICO (Oct. 30, 2020), https://ico.org.uk/actionweve-taken/enforcement/marriott-international-inc/.
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€14,500,000; (ix) 1&1 Telecom GmbH (Germany), €9,550,000; (x)
Eni Gas e Luce (Italy), €8,500,000; (xi) €3,000,000; (xii) Google LLC
(Sweden), €7,000,000; (xiii) National Revenue Agency (Bulgaria),
€2,600,000; and (xiv) Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse (Germany),
€1,240,000.345 Other than the CNIL Google fine and the Data
Protection Authority of Sweden Google fine, the only four other fines
of a U.S. Tech Giant are a Data Protection Authority of Hamburg fine
assessed on Facebook Germany GmbH in the amount of €51,000,346 far
below the maximum fine that could have been assessed,347 a more
recent Belgian DPA (Autorité de protection des données (APD)) fine
imposed on Google Belgium SA, in the amount of €600,000;348 and a
Hungarian DPA fine of Google Ireland Ltd. in the amount of €58.349
Thus, while a few multimillion euro fines have been assessed, there has
not been a fine of a U.S. Tech Giant in the hundreds of millions of
euros, much less in the billions. However, the larger fines do benefit
from the increased maximum levels allowed by the GDPR, as do even
the intermediate fines. This analysis is important, although not enough,
as indicated by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Affairs (known as the LIBE Committee) of the European Parliament,
which called for the following:
345
See GDPR Enforcement Tracker, CMS, https://enforcementtracker.com
(last visited on July 8, 2020) (this listing of GDPR fines is compiled by global
law firm CMS, through its German member CMS Hasche Sigle Partnerschaft
von Rechtsanwälten und Steuerberatern mbB).
346
Id.
347
See Facebook Germany GmbH, DUN & BRADSTREET (last visited on July
13, 2020), https://www.dnb.com/business-directory/companyprofiles.facebook_germany_gmbh.84c0ca792f206051f23fa9d29059a699.ht
ml (In 2017, Facebook Germany GmbH revenue was $42.05 million). Based
only on the revenue of the German subsidiary, the maximum fine for a first
offense by a company would be either $10 million or $20 million, depending
on the category of the violation. If assessed on Google segment revenue of
Alphabet Inc., the figure increases dramatically, as the 2019 revenue was
$160.74 billion. Annual revenue of Google from 2002 to 2019, STATISTA
(last visited on Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266206/googles-annual-global-revenue/.
348
Autorité de protection des données, 600,000 euros d’amende: l’APD
sanctionne Google Belgium pour non-respect du droit à l’oubli [600,000
Euros Fine: APD Sanctions Google Belgium for Non-Compliance with the
Right to be Forgotten] (July 14, 2020),
https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/news/600000-euros-d-amende-lapd-sanctionne-google-belgium-pour-non-respect-du-droit-a-l-oubli.
349
See id.
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Regarding the level of enforcement and
specifically the sanctions foreseen under the GDPR,
an evaluation of the appropriateness and the
effectiveness of the fines issued in relation to the
violations of the GDPR should be conducted. For this
purpose, the sanctions issued for infringements of the
GDPR should be broken down by category, by
industry and by size of business. Any calculation
mechanism used by DPAs would show the
enforcement practice and could allow to give an
indication of the proportion of sanctions/fines issued
in relation to reported breaches. Furthermore, since
several DPAs have started imposing fines on data
controllers, it would be relevant to assess the impact
of fines issued in relation to the violations of the
GDPR and whether the fines have led to subsequent
compliance.350
Nonetheless, the DPA of one very important jurisdiction, Ireland,
where many U.S. Tech Giants have their EU headquarters, in July
2019, was reported to have eleven investigations underway for
Facebook violations of the GDPR, with at least two rulings likely in
the then-coming months.351 The Irish Commissioner for Data
Protection—Helen Dixon—underscored both the Irish DPA’s role in
public enforcement of the GDPR and in providing guidance to
companies so that they may comply with the law. Speaking about the
second year of the GDPR’s application, the Irish DPA stated that the
conclusion of ongoing investigations will “showcase how the
corrective and fining powers afforded to data protection authorities can
be utilized.”352 Of the nineteen ongoing “statutory inquiries” in Ireland,
most concern the U.S. Tech Giants and their subsidiaries: Facebook
counts for a total of eleven (eight for the parent, two for WhatsApp,
350

Annex to the Letter of the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament
of 21 February 2020 to Commissioner Reynders, Ref: IPOL-COM-LIBE D
(2020)6525 at 4, https://www.politico.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/SKM_C45820030616021.pdf.
351
See Adam Satariano, Facebook Dodged a Bullet from the F.T.C. It Faces
Many More., N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://nyti.ms/30xFwm0 (the Irish
DPA is also reported to have been investigating Google). Note that, as of June
30, 2020, those two rulings had not yet been issued.
352
Press Release, Data Protection Commission, Data Protection Commission
Reflects on the First Year of the GDPR (May 24, 2019),
https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/press-releases/data-protectioncommission-reflects-first-year-gdpr.
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and one for Instagram); Apple for two; Google for one; and Microsoft
subsidiary LinkedIn for one. Of the remaining cases, Twitter accounts
for three and Quantcast for one.353
The Irish DPA itself reported that it had received 6,624
complaints in the GDPR’s first year,354 and that it would conclude
investigations within the GDPR’s second year, including those
involving certain internet platforms.355 In addition to Google, Apple
and Twitter were named.356 However, as of June 30, 2020, the Irish
DPA had assessed only two fines, each on Tusla Child and Family
Agency, in the amounts of €75,000 and €40,000, respectively, and both
assessed in the second quarter of 2020.357 As of that date, no data
protection fine under the GDPR had been imposed by Ireland on a U.S.
Tech Giant.
D. EU Institutional Reactions to GDPR Enforcement and
GDPR Cooperation and Consistency Mechanisms
The European Commission described the “lack of blockbuster
fines” during the GDPR’s first year as nothing to be concerned
about.358 It qualified national data protection authorities’ actions as a
“balanced approach to enforcement powers,” adding that “[t]hey have
focused on dialogue rather than sanctions, in particular for the smallest
operators which do not process personal data as a core activity.”359 The
Commission indicated that some of the delay in action was due to
353

See Simon Carswell, GDPR One Year On: No Fines But Considerable
Amounts of Dread, IRISH TIMES (May 25, 2019),
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/gdpr-one-year-on-no-finesbut-considerable-amounts-of-dread-1.3903169.
354
See id. As a point of comparison, the French regulator (CNIL) indicated
in its activity report for 2019 that it had received 14,000 complaints during
the year, an increase of more than 27% compared with the previous year, of
which 20% were cross-border complaints. See Rapport d’activité 2019,
CNIL, (June 2020) https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil40e_rapport_annuel_2019.pdf.
355
See Press Release, Data Protection Commission, supra note 352.
356
See Carswell, supra note 353.
357
See GDPR Enforcement Tracker, supra note 345.
358
See Mehreen Khan, Brussels Defends Lack of Blockbuster Fines for Big
Tech Groups, FIN. TIMES (July 23, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/3629b0fc-ad73-11e9-8030-530adfa879c2. This
view has been echoed more recently: see Catherine Stupp, EU Privacy
Regulators Found to Lack Staff, Funds to Enforce GDPR, WSJ PRO
CYBERSECURITY (June 29, 2020, 5:30 AM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-privacy-regulators-found-to-lack-stafffunds-to-enforce-gdpr-11593423000.
359
See Data Protection Rules as a Trust-Enabler, supra note 284, at 4.

2021]

EU GDPR SANCTIONS

69

DPAs wanting to ensure that they have cases that respect procedure,
and it also focused on the change in culture and behavior of relevant
actors as a sign of success.360 Furthermore, concern was expressed
about whether the DPAs have the necessary resources to bring the big
cases.361 The preference given to educational action during the
implementation phase of the new regulation with dissuasive sanctions
is quite typical of a regulatory approach to sanctions.362 Nevertheless,
certain hypotheses (lack of resources, reluctance to initiate
proceedings, etc.) put forward by the Commission suggest that the
practice of national regulators' supervisory and sanctioning powers
does not allow sanctions to play their full role.363
The GDPR itself calls for a report by the Commission on an
evaluation and review of that regulation, particularly covering crossborder personal data transfers and cooperation and consistency
mechanisms involving the DPAs and the EDPB by May 25, 2020, and
every four years thereafter.364 On January 21, 2020, the Council
adopted365 its position and findings on the application of the General
Data Protection Regulation (Council Position),366 meant to contribute
to the Commission’s 2020 review. In the Council considered that
cooperation be strengthened between Member State Supervisory
Authorities, “as it is particularly relevant for the supervision of crossborder processing involving risks or for the processing concerning
many Member States, for instance as regards so-called big tech
companies.”367 However, the Council found that it was too early to
assess the functioning of GDPR’s cooperation and consistency
mechanisms.368
The EDPB also contributed to the discussion around the
Commission’s GDPR evaluation and review in a document adopted on

360

Id. at 5.
See Khan, supra note 358.
362
See Arnaud Lecourt, RGPD: nouvelles contraintes, nouvelles stratégies
pour les entreprises, 2019 DALLOZ IP/IT 205 (Apr. 9, 2019) (commenting on
the pedagogical role of the CNIL from the start).
363
See Nemitz, supra note 58, at 2.
364
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 97(1)–(2).
365
Council of the European Union Brussels Press release 5332/20, Outcome
of the Council Meeting, 3743rd Council Meeting, Economic and Financial
Affairs (Jan. 21, 2020).
366
Council of the European Union Brussels ‘A’ Item Note, Council Position
and Findings on the Application of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), 14994/2/19 REV 2 (Jan. 15, 2020).
367
Id. at 5.
368
Id. at 10.
361
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February 18, 2020.369 It noted that the divergence of national
procedures and practices negatively impacted the cooperation and
consistency mechanisms, and that Supervisory Authority resources
were insufficient.370 Furthermore, consistent interpretation of GDPR
terms is needed, among other concerns.371 However, it is clear that the
cooperation and consistency mechanisms are still in a breaking-in
period and, for example, the joint operation procedure under Article 62
of the GDPR has not yet been triggered by the Supervisory
Authorities,372 and the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Article
65 of the GDPR has not led to the adoption of a binding decision as,
“so far the involved SAs have been able to reach consensus on crossborder cases in the cooperation mechanism.”373
During the period from May 25, 2018 to December 31, 2019,
1346 procedures were initiated to identify the Lead Supervisory
Authority (and also the Concerned Supervisory Authorities) for the
OSS, and cases with a cross-border element were registered in the
central Internal Market Information (IMI) Case register database.374
During the same period, 807 cases were registered in the IMI database,
for which the following countries were the six countries serving as
Lead Supervisory Authority for the largest amount of cases: Ireland
(127 cases), Germany (92 cases), Luxembourg (87 cases), France (64
cases), the United Kingdom (56 cases), and the Netherlands (45
cases).375 As noted by the Commission, the “ranking reflects notably
the specific situation of Ireland and Luxembourg, who host several big
multinational tech companies,”376 notably those this study refers to as
the U.S. Big Tech Companies.
A further contribution to the Commission’s evaluation was
made by an expert group that it set up, including business associations,
civil society associations, and individual professional or academic

369

EDPB, supra note 250.
Id. at 3.
371
Id. at 12.
372
Id. at 14.
373
Id. at 17.
374
Id. at 7.
375
EDPB, supra note 250, at 8.
376
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document
Accompanying the Document Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council, Data Protection as a Pillar of Citizens’
Empowerment Citizens’ Empowerment and the EU’s Approach to the Digital
Transition – Two Years Digital Transition – Two Years of Application of the
General Data Protection Regulation, at 7, SWD(2020) 115 final (June 24,
2020).
370
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members (Multistakeholder Expert Group).377 In its report, the
Multistakeholder Expert Group highlighted the need to prevent
fragmentation in application of the GDPR rules,378 and its civil society
members called for “stronger and more coordinated enforcement of the
data protection rules by DPAs.”379 Several comments were made about
enforcement actions: although not consistent in all sectors, an increase
in complaints to DPAs was noted; however there was no significant
increase in court actions caused by the GDPR.380
Several uses of representative actions under Article 80 of the
GDPR were remarked in the report, where civil society and consumer
organizations acted, generally under a mandate from individuals: (i)
NOYB and LQDN complaints filed on the first day of application of
the GDPR with several DPAs against U.S. Tech Giants Google,
Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft;381 (ii) a coordinated action
by consumer organizations against Google launched in November
377

Contribution from the Multistakeholder Expert Group to the Commission
2020 Evaluation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
Multistakeholder Expert Group to support the application of Regulation
(EU) 2016/679, Report, at 3–4 (June 17, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.group
MeetingDoc&docid=41708, [hereinafter Expert Group Report].
378
Id. at 5.
379
Id.
380
Id. at 13 (“Several members reported complaints related to transparency
obligations, consent, request for identification by the controller before
responding to a data subject’s request, and the exercise of data subjects’ rights
in particular the right of access… Most business members indicate that there
was either no court action or no significant increase in the number of court
actions against their members’ organisations caused by the GDPR”).
381
Id. at 14 (these complaints were centered on the issue of consent). A couple
of these complaints resulted in the CNIL’s largest administrative fine so far,
in the Google LLC case discussed in Part III.A.2.b. One law firm commented
that, “This indicates that if a well-known not-for-profit organization lodges a
basic but sufficiently argued claim, it might be sufficient for a data protection
authority to launch an investigation. Also, the success of the collective
complaint of this case may encourage data subjects to utilize a collective
complaint and/or redress mechanism provided for under Article 80 GDPR.”
Romain Perray, Euro Fifty Million GDPR Fine on Google by French Data
Protection
Authority,
LEXOLOGY
(July
9,
2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=67739262-9e11-4664-ac721576414b9e48 (the author also mentioned that the case was carried out
entirely online, without on-site inspect, leading him to conclude that, “A data
protection authority may now easily investigate digital businesses even if their
offices are located outside its geographical jurisdiction,” increasing risk of
investigations for global digital business).
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2018, involved the filing of complaints regarding the processing of
location data with the DPAs of Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands,
Slovenia, Greece, the Czech Republic and Poland;382 (iii) Privacy
International filed complaints in November 2018, as a civil society
organization, without mandates of individuals, against seven data
brokers and credit reference agencies for profiling without a legal basis,
and for failure to comply with certain data protection principles, with
DPAs in France, Ireland and the United Kingdom;383 (iv) Open Rights
Group, Panoptykon Foundation and their partners in December 2018,
and January 2019, filed complaints regarding online behavioral
advertising processing;384 and (v) Norwegian consumer association
Forbrukerrådet filed complaints in January 2020, in Norway regarding
ad-tech processing.385 Nonetheless, “many Member States have not
made use of Article 80(2) of the GDPR, which would allow NGOs to
bring forward collective complaints without having to be directly
mandated by individuals,”386 however, civil society and consumer
organizations are contemplating bringing actions before courts in order
to obtain compensation for data subjects.387 Finally, response by DPAs
to actions brought so far has been slow, with decisions on important
cross-border cases not yet rendered.388
In its June 2020 communication, the Commission committed
to pursuing exchanges with EU Member States regarding national DPA
resources, called on the EDPB to increase cooperation among DPAs,
including through joint investigations,389 supported reflection within
the EDPB on improving cooperation among the DPAs on cross-border
cases, and stated that “Member States shall allocate resources to data
protection authorities that are sufficient for them to perform their
tasks.”390

382

Expert Group Report, supra note 377, at 14 (this was reported by BEUC).
Id.
384
Id. (this was reported by Access Now).
385
Id.
386
Id. at 15.
387
Id.
388
Expert Group Report, supra note 377, at 15–16.
389
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council, Data Protection as a Pillar of Citizens’ Empowerment and the
EU’s Approach to the Digital Transition – Two Years Digital Transition –
Two Years of Application of the General Data Protection Regulation, at 15,
COM(2020) 264 final (June 24, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/1_en_act_part1_v6_1.pdf.
390
Id. at 16.
383
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E. Conclusion on GDPR Sanctions
In this study’s Introduction, the question was asked, does the
reality of supervisory authority action support the theoretical goals for
GDPR sanctions? In Part I this study discussed the goals of sanctions
to include the main objective of acting as a deterrent, providing an
incentive for companies to comply with the regulations. However,
other functions for sanctions exist: the incapacitation effect; the
budgetary effect; the normative and symbolic effect; the consolidation
of the market by weakening an artificially dominant actor effect, and
so on. However, this study has shown that the deterrence effect is
perhaps the most important sub-goal of sanctions in the context of
GDPR sanctions, with the symbolic function also playing an important
role.
From today’s viewpoint, given the failure of Ireland and
Luxembourg to issue substantial fines on the U.S. Tech Giants, and
given the relatively moderate level of fines indicated in Section C.3.,
the answer has to be that the reality of GDPR sanctions has not yet
supported the theoretical goals of GDPR sanctions—especially the
deterrence and symbolic sub-goals—which to a fairly large extent
require effective and substantial sanctions. Furthermore, although the
combination of action on the competition, data protection and
consumer protection fronts has provided the strongest challenge to U.S.
Tech Giants so far, doubts have been expressed about the ability of
“mere fines” to help bring them into rein.391 However, the enforcement
toolbox has expanded considerably, and collective action provides
possibilities for individuals to more easily bring complaints. In this
context, this study now investigates strategic aspects and risks.
III.

STRATEGIC ASPECTS AND RISKS: LACK OF UNDERSTANDING
OF THE GDPR, NON-COMPLIANCE AND NON-ENFORCEMENT

As part of its investigation of the impact of sanctions, this study
will analyze strategic aspects and risks, first from the standpoint of
companies,392 which may react in an incorrect way, either through a
lack of understanding of the GDPR, or through a conscious decision to
391

See Julia Powles, The EU is Right to Take on Facebook, But Mere Fines
Don’t Protect Us from Tech Giants, Guardian (May 27, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/20/eu-right-to-takeon-facebook-fines-dont-protect-us-from-tech-giants (stating, in this opinion
piece, that “[i]If we are really to change the dynamics of the modern data
economy, it is going to take more than just targeted arrows and small-fry fines.
The true response to Facebook is to see it as a company that ruthlessly
monetizes every aspect of our everyday lives.”).
392
Lecourt, supra note 362.
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try to game the system or to fail to comply (Section A), before looking
at the risks of non-enforcement by DPAs and the effect this may have
on companies (Section B).
A. Risks Involved with Lack of Understanding of the GDPR
and Non-Compliance
Firms faced with decisions regarding the processing of
personal data might, for lack of understanding of the provisions of the
GDPR, prove too zealous or even fail to comply with the legislation.
Furthermore, companies may be tempted, given the GDPR
enforcement record of the European DPAs to data, to assume greater
risks with respect to non-compliance, or to try to arbitrage based on the
position of the various DPAs to date. However, this study argues that
such reactions would be poor corporate strategy. In order to analyze
these risks and strategic aspects, focusing on the action of companies,
this study engages the legal strategy and compliance literature. This
Part begins with a short discussion of legal strategy and competitive
advantage (Section 1), then analyzes certain aspects of understanding
the GDPR (Section 2), prior to discussing compliance, noncompliance, and sanctions (Section 3).
1. Legal Strategy and Competitive Advantage
Strategy theory informs us that, at least in emerging industries
outside of “a traditionally regulated sphere” regulation may be imposed
abruptly, slowing the industry’s progress.393 The U.S. Tech Giants,
based in a culture where entrepreneurs live by the mantra, “Move fast
and break things,” attributed to Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg,394 have
developed in a legal culture where there has been meager protection of
data privacy.395 Arguably, this has given them a competitive advantage
over companies from jurisdictions such as the European Union, where
certain actions are prohibited or restrained by data protection law. In
the legal strategy literature, while the baseline discussion relates to
what behavior is illegal, mere compliance is considered a limiting
position, compared to the use of law proactively, to create and capture

393
MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR
ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS, 224 (1st ed. 1980).
394
Hemant Taneja, The Era of “Move Fast and Break Things” Is Over, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-era-of-move-fast-andbreak-things-is-over.
395
See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639,
642 (2014). See also W. Gregory Voss, Cross-Border Data Flows, the GDPR,
and Data Governance, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 485, 491–92 (2020).
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value and obtain competitive advantage.396 Seidel and Haapio discuss
the diminishment of legal comparative advantage as a result of
convergence of substantive and procedural law globally.397 While
Seidel and Haapio cite several fields of law for which this is the case
(contract, product liability, environmental law, securities regulation,
and sexual harassment),398 data protection or data privacy law does not
figure on their list. Data privacy law has not been harmonized
internationally, especially not between the United States and the
European Union.399 However, one of the arguably subsidiary aims of
the GDPR400 has been to eliminate what has been seen as an element
of competitive advantage of U.S. Tech Giants by levelling the playing
field between European companies and non-European ones such as the
U.S. Tech Giants401 in the area of data privacy. The GDPR, with its
extraterritorial effect, may be considered the abrupt imposition of
regulation on the U.S. Tech Giants (unless they scrupulously renounce
396

See Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do with It?: Integrating Law
and Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 587–88 (2010).
397
George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive
Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641, 645 (2010).
398
Id. at 645–46.
399
See W. Gregory Voss, Obstacles to Transatlantic Harmonization of Data
Privacy Law in Context, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 405, 408–12 (2019).
400
The GDPR’s stated objectives are twofold:
2.
This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms
of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of
personal data.
3.
The free movement of personal data within the Union shall
be neither restricted nor prohibited for reasons connected with the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data.
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 1(2)–(3).
401
See, e.g., Questions and Answers – General Data Protection Regulation,
EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_387
(“The same rules for all companies – regardless of where they are
established: Today European companies have to adhere to stricter standards
than companies established outside the EU but also doing business in our
Single Market. With the reform, companies based outside of Europe will
have to apply the same rules when they offer goods or services on the EU
market. This creates a level playing field.”) (emphasis omitted). See also
Manuel Klar, Binding Effects of the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) on U.S. Companies, 11 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 101,
124 (2020) (“In Europe, the aspect of the new approach that received the
most praise was the equality of competition between companies in and
outside of the European Union.”) (citation omitted).
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the European market that is not realistic) of which the strategy theory
spoke.
2. Understanding
the
GDPR:
Understanding of the Law

Management

Seidel has set out an action plan for achieving competitive
advantage, called the “Manager’s Legal Plan,” the first of four steps of
which is “management understanding of the law.”402 A manager must
have an understanding of the law in order to implement further steps in
order to obtain competitive advantage.403 This is important with respect
to an American company faced with GDPR compliance because of
major differences between the EU and U.S. law,404 including even
differences in terminology and concepts.405 This Section illustrates the
importance of management understanding the law through two cases:
first, this study discusses the understanding of the law and risks of overcompliance (Section a), before discussing management understanding
of the OSS mechanism (and the concept of “main establishment”) and
efforts to forum shop (Section b).
a. Over-Compliance
Bagley informs us that lawyers may be incentivized to
“overstate legal risk,” and be overly conservative, such as when faced

402

See Siedel & Haapio, supra note 397, at 651–52 (discussing Siedel’s
Manager’s Legal Plan); see Siedel, Using the Law for Competitive Advantage,
20–25 (2002).
403
See Siedel & Haapio, supra note 397, at 651.
404
See, e.g., Voss, supra note 399, at 417–27 (discussing the lack of
harmonization between EU and U.S. “data privacy” law).
405
See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal
Information in the United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877
(2014) (examples regarding the differences between the concepts and terms of
“personal data” in the European Union, and “personal information” or
“personally-identifiable information (PII)” in the United States); see also
Nancy J. King & V.T. Raja, What Do They Really Know About Me in the
Cloud?: A Comparative Law Perspective on Protecting Privacy and Security
of Sensitive Consumer Data, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 422–32 (2013) (regarding
the differences in the concept of “sensitive data” or “sensitive information”
between the European Union—which actually refers to “special categories of
data”—and the United States); see also Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 310,
321 (on a U.S. view of sensitive data and on sensitive data in the European
Union); and see Voss, supra note 399, at 408–09 (on the difference in
terminology among the terms “privacy,” “data privacy,” and “data
protection.”).
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with “high ambiguity,”406 which may be the case in the early years of
the GDPR’s application. Top management familiarity with the GDPR
and DPA guidance may help them be what Bagley describes as “legally
astute,”407 allowing them to treat the GDPR as a business issue with a
business solution. Bird and Park discuss using corporate compliance to
obtain competitive advantage, acknowledging that different firms have
different profiles where compliance is concerned, and arguing that
firms may tend to over-comply with regulation out of a
“disproportionate fear of sanction.”408 This may be the case with data
protection breach reporting under the GDPR, which does not require a
notification to the DPA if the “data breach is unlikely to result in a risk
to the rights and freedoms of natural persons,”409 for example, where
data have been properly encrypted so that unauthorized parties are
unable to read them.410 As stated by the ICO’s Deputy Commissioner
(Operations) in 2018,
Some controllers are “over-reporting”:
reporting a breach just to be transparent, because they
want to manage their perceived risk or because they
think that everything needs to be reported. We
understand this will be an issue in the early months of
a new system but we will be working with
406
Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378, 382 (2008).
407
Id.
408
Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance Into
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 310 (2017) (citation
omitted).
409
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 33(1).
410
Cédric Burton, Article 33. Notification of a Personal Data Personal Data
Breach to the Supervisory Authority, THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION
REGULATION (GDPR): A COMMENTARY 640, 647 (Christopher Kuner et al.,
2020) (“The WP29 has also given examples of situations where the rights and
freedoms of natural persons are not at issue, such as where the personal data
are already publicly available and their disclosure does not present a likely
risk to the individuals concerned, and when data have been properly encrypted
so that they have been made unintelligible to unauthorised parties and a copy
or a backup exists”) (citing Article 29 Data Protection. Working Party,
Guidelines on Personal Data Breach Notification under Regulation 2016/679,
WP 250rev.01, as last revised and adopted on Feb. 6, 2018, at 18–19),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=612052.
Those Guidelines were endorsed by the GDPR. See Personal Data Breach
Notifications, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD (May 25, 2018),
https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/guideline/personaldata-breach-notifications_en (GDPR endorsing those guidelines).
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organisations to try and discourage this in future once
we are all more familiar with the new threshold.411
A greater understanding of the GDPR’s data breach notification
requirements could help alleviate this issue, for example, and the ICO
has published self-assessment tools to help achieve this.412 DPA
guidance is an effective source of material that may help management
to better understand compliance issues. With regard to the expressive
function of sanctions, we have noted that some DPAs may be tempted
to impose sanctions more particularly against emblematic companies
such as U.S. tech giants. Then the problem of over-compliance should
be considered by companies in relation to their risk of being subject to
exemplary sanctions because of their notoriety. Larger companies may
need to be more cautious than smaller or less well-known companies.
It can be hypothesized that the risk of sanction related to the expressive
function of sanctions is not completely independent of the way public
opinion views a company. Although DPAs are supposed to be
"independent" according to the GDPR,413 this independence is
understood more as an independence from governments and market
players than from citizens in general, since the objective of the GDPR
is to protect them in particular.414 From this point of view, there could
be an influence of public opinion and a propensity of DPAs to consider
exemplary sanctions against a company. In other words, the occurrence
of a scandal or circumstances affecting trust in the company (such as a
major case of lack of data security, illegitimate exploitation of data for
political purposes for example) could lead some DPAs to impose heavy
sanctions on liable companies.
b. The OSS
Shopping”

Mechanism

and

“Forum

Another area where management could be well served by a full
understanding of data protection law is with respect to the OSS
mechanism. While the GDPR, through its extraterritorial scope, was
intended to avoid forum shopping in the sense that had the legislation’s
411

ICO Deputy Commissioner (Operations) James Dipple-Johnstone – speech
to the CBI Cyber Security: Business Insight Conference, INFORMATION
COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE (Sept. 12, 2018), https://ico.org.uk/about-theico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/09/cbi-cyber-security-businessinsight-conference/.
412
Self-Assessment for Data Breaches, INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S
OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/personal-databreach-assessment/ (last visited on July 18, 2020).
413
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 52.
414
Id. art. 51(1).
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jurisdiction been based solely in the place of the registered office of a
data controller, a company might have been able to avoid the
application of EU law (and thus avoid requirements for compliance) by
setting up its registered office outside of the European Union,415 it may
still seem to provide a basis for forum shopping through the OSS
mechanism.416 This relates to the concept that, based on enforcement
records of the GDPR to-date by the various EU Member States, U.S.
and other non-EU companies may engage in legal arbitrage, choosing
their forum for potential discussions of administrative sanctions using
the OSS mechanism. This is arguably what the U.S. Tech Giants have
already done through their choices for a jurisdiction in which to locate
their EU headquarters,417 maybe because of the perception that Ireland,
given its size and the resources its DPA has available for
enforcement,418 might be a jurisdiction unlikely to be zealous in
415

See Klar, supra note 401, at 124 (commenting that a “marketplace rule” for
jurisdiction was chosen over this “origin rule approach”).
416
See supra Part II.C.2 (OSS Mechanism, noting that the term “forum
shopping” may not be the perfect word choice to reflect these “forum
choices”); see also Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum
Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 582 (2017) (Bookman comments
that “the practice of global forum shopping is deplored but poorly defined,”
with critics using it as a derogatory term to refer to forum choices, instead.
This study has retained the controversial term, not only because it is used in
this context in the literature, but also because the forum choice determines (in
many cases) the choice of lead DPA.).
417
See Vinocur, supra note 217 (The “two nations most directly responsible
for policing the tech sector” as a result of having the main tech companies
having their EU headquarters there are Ireland and Luxembourg, with Ireland
overseeing Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Twitter.); see also Adam
Satariano, New Privacy Rules Could Make This Woman One of Tech’s Most
Important Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018) [hereinafter Satariano,
New Privacy], https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/technology/gdpr-helendixon.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/technology/gdpr-helendixon.html (Airbnb and Apple likewise have their EU headquarters in
Ireland); see Adam Satariano, Europe’s Privacy Law Hasn’t Shown Its Teeth,
Frustrating Advocates, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2020 [hereinafter Satariano,
Europe’s Privacy], last updated Apr. 28, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2S79ZW8
(Luxembourg’s DPA has the responsibility for regulating Amazon).
418
See Satariano, Europe’s Privacy, supra note 417 (Although Ireland has
an “outsize influence” in GDPR enforcement, because of the U.S. Tech
Giants that it regulates, its DPA’s budget is only sixth among EU DPAs, and
it has only been able to obtain a third of the budget increase it sought.
However, it has increased staff from 27 in 2017 to 140); see also Will
Goodbody, Data Protection Commissioner Defends Speed of Investigations
into Tech Firms, RTE (Jul. 14, 2020, 16:53),
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enforcing the GDPR, although assuredly other factors such as low
corporate income tax rates, an English speaking population and a
business-friendly and common law-based environment have played a
role in the decision.419 However, it may be argued that data subjects
benefit from the possibility of forum shopping, as well, as they may
choose to file a complaint against a private sector entity with the DPA
of either the EU Member State of their “habitual place of residence,
place of work, or place of the infringement.”420 The OSS mechanism
may not apply in such a case if there is no cross-border processing.421
https://www.rte.ie/news/technology/2020/0714/1153293-data-protectioncommission/ (The head of Ireland’s DPA, when asked “whether her office
has sufficient resources to regulate tech companies as lead regulator in the
EU, she said it depends on how quickly people anticipate outputs will be
generated,” and elaborate that the authority has, “enough resources and the
right resources to conclude, but we can’t do it all simultaneously and
immediately.”); but see John Naughton, Data Protection Laws are Great.
Shame They are not Being Enforced, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2020) (In this
opinion piece, the author refers to an investigation by the developers of the
Brave browser, and comments that the “most worrying deficit” of technical
experts “is in the Irish DPA, which, according to the Brave report, has only
21 tech-enforcement roles. The fact that most of the tech giants have their
European HQs in Dublin means that the Irish authority has the heaviest
enforcement workload; it’s currently the lead authority for 127 cases and yet
its budget is being squeezed by the Irish government.”).
419
See Vinocur, supra note 217 (Ireland is reported to have a “history of law
oversight of the technology industry.”); see also Satariano, New Privacy,
supra note 417.
420
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 77(1); see e.g., Joshua Blume, A Contextual
Extraterritoriality Analysis of the DPIA and DPO Provisions in the GDPR, 49
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1425, 1444 (2018) (“Connected with the “‘one stop shop’”
provision . . . this will essentially provide data subjects the opportunity to
forum shop, finding the DPA with the most bandwidth, availability, and
aggressive stance.”).
421
See Case C-230/14, Weltimmo s. r. o. v. Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és
Információszabadság Hatóság, 2015 E.C.L. I-639(Oct. 1, 2015) (In the same
vein, but under the EU DP Directive, Weltimmo is instructive in that,
“Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as permitting the
application of the law on the protection of personal data of a Member State
other than the Member State in which the controller with respect to the
processing of those data is registered, in so far as that controller exercises,
through stable arrangements in the territory of that Member State, a real and
effective activity — even a minimal one — in the context of which that
processing is carried out.” Id. at ¶ 41),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=168944&p
ageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1159155

2021]

EU GDPR SANCTIONS

81

One case deserves special attention here: Google LLC. In it,
the French DPA—the CNIL–received complaints by NOYB and
LQDN against Google LLC. On January 21, 2019, the CNIL issued its
highest administrative fine ever—for €50 million—against Google
LLC in the case for failure to comply with GDPR obligations of
transparency and information, and for lack of a legitimate basis for
advertising personalization processing.422 Regarding the OSS
mechanism, the CNIL stated the following:
In this case, the discussions with the other
authorities, in particular with the Irish DPA, where
GOOGLE’s European headquarters are situated, did
not allow to consider that GOOGLE had a main
establishment in the European Union. Indeed, when
the CNIL initiated proceedings, the Irish establishment
did not have a decision-making power on the
processing operations carried out in the context of the
operating system Android and the services provided
by GOOGLE LLC, in relation to the creation of an
account during the configuration of a mobile phone.
As the “one-stop-shop mechanism” was not
applicable, the CNIL was competent to take any
decision regarding processing operations carried out
by GOOGLE LLC, as were the other DPA.423
The CNIL’s analysis refers to the concept of “main establishment”
discussed in Part II.C.2. Google LLC argued that the CNIL did not have
competence to deal with the complaints, as it considered that Google
Ireland Limited, its Irish subsidiary, “must be considered its main
4; see also Waltraut Kotschy, Article 77 Right to Lodge a Complaint with a
Supervisory Authority, THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION
(GDPR): A COMMENTARY 1117, 1122–23 (Christopher Kuner et al., 2020)
(providing a short discussion of the Weltimmo case: a Slovakia registered
company targeted exclusively clients in Hungary for its processing activities,
and the CJEU considered that the Hungarian DPA could hear claims against
the Slovakian company, brought by Hungarian data subjects). When
juxtaposed to here, there was no cross-border processing, in the sense of the
term’s definition set out in Part II.C.2, as only Hungary was concerned by
the processing.
422
The CNIL’s Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50
Million Euros Against GOOGLE LLC, CNIL (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-financial-penalty50-million-euros-against-google-llc.
423
Id.
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establishment within the European Union for some of the cross-border
processing that it carried out, and particularly that subject of the
complaints received by the CNIL.”424 The CNIL considered that in
order to be considered the main establishment, Google Ireland Limited
would have to “have decision-making power with regard to the
processing of the personal data in question.”425
The CNIL found that the Irish subsidiary was not mentioned in
the relevant privacy policy, and that in any event, when the proceedings
were initiated there was no proof that Google Ireland Limited
possessed decision-making power regarding the relevant processing
and that Google LLC was the only developer of the Android operating
system involved.426 Furthermore, Google LLC wrote in a letter to the
CNIL “that the “transfer of responsibility” from Google LLC to Google
Ireland Limited for certain personal data processing operations relating
to European citizens would be complete on January 31, 2019,” and the
relevant privacy policy would come into effect on January 22, 2019—
a day after the CNIL’s sanction was issued.427 As a result, the CNIL
considered that Google Ireland Limited was not the main establishment
for the processing in question, which allowed the CNIL to act against
Google LLC,428 as the Irish DPA was not then lead DPA. On appeal by
Google to France’s highest administrative court, the Council of State
(Conseil d’Etat) agreed with the CNIL that at the time of the decision
Google Ireland Limited did not fulfil the criteria to be considered the
main establishment for the relevant processing, and thus that there was
not then a lead DPA,429 and rejected Google LLC’s petition for the
quashing of the sanction.430
This case highlights the importance of understanding the law,
including all important definitions (such as that of “main
establishment”), in assessing the compliance environment, thus
looping back to the discussion in Section 2 above. However, it also
underscores the ways in which the GDPR helps avoid the use of forum
shopping, and focuses on the facts to determine the reality of the data
424

See Deliberation No. SAN-2019-001 of the Restricted Committee of the
CNIL, supra note 114, at 4 (¶ 23).
425
Id. at 5 (¶ 30).
426
Id. at 6 (¶¶ 36–38).
427
Id. at 6 (¶ 39).
428
Id. at 6 (¶ 40–41).
429
CE, June 19, 2020 (Société Google LLC No. 430810), at 5 (¶ 6),
https://www.conseil-etat.fr/ressources/decisions-contentieuses/dernieresdecisions-importantes/conseil-d-etat-19-juin-2020-sanction-infligee-agoogle-par-la-cnil (page and paragraph numbers refer to the PDF form of this
decision, downloadable at this address).
430
Id. at 12 (¶ 28).
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processing situation on which to base procedural requirements (such as
the OSS) intended to help ensure enforcement and, as a result,
compliance. This is crystal clear from the text of the Article 29
Working Party Guidelines:
The GDPR does not permit ‘forum shopping’.
If a company claims to have its main establishment in
one Member State, but no effective and real exercise
of management activity or decision making over the
processing of personal data takes place there, the
relevant supervisory authorities (or ultimately EDPB)
will decide which supervisory authority is the ‘lead’,
using objective criteria and looking at the evidence.431
Thus, in terms of legal strategy, it would seem that efforts at complying
with the law, instead of those attempting to avoid compliance through
forum shopping, would be more productively spent.
3. Compliance, Non-Compliance and Sanctions
Bagley remarks that in order to realize benefits from corporate
resources, legal measures must be implemented by firms; the failure to
do so can have “very negative monetary return,”432 which might be the
case if large administrative fines were imposed under the GDPR.
Furthermore, shareholder value may be destroyed as a result of
violations,433 and in the area of data privacy, this might be the case if
violations lead to loss of customer trust.434 In contrast, Voss and Houser
431

WP 244, supra note 317, at 8.
See Bagley, supra note 396, at 607–08.
433
Id. at 608.
434
See Rafi Goldberg, Lack of Trust in Internet Privacy and Security May
Deter Economic and Other Online Activities, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO.
ADMIN. (May 13, 2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/lack-trustinternet-privacy-and-security-may-deter-economic-and-other-onlineactivities. The U.S. Department of Commerce has indicated that the lack of
trust in Internet privacy in the U.S. is hampering economic activity. Id. These
privacy concerns continued in a more recent version of the survey. See Rafi
Goldberg, Most AMS. Continue to Have Privacy and Security Concerns, NTIA
Survey Finds, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2018/most-americans-continue-have-privacyand-security-concerns-ntia-survey-finds. Voss and Houser point to a decline
of Facebook’s social media market share as a result of concern regarding loss
of privacy and potential security issues, following the Cambridge Analytica
scandal. See Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 337. That boils down to a loss
of trust, which could cause users to be reluctant to share their personal data.
Id. at 338.
432
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argue that U.S. Tech Giants can use their GDPR compliance to garner
trust from their customers.435 Indeed, the Commission has echoed this
view, citing consumer demand for privacy:
A growing number of companies have
responded to this demand for privacy notably by
voluntarily extending some of the rights and
safeguards provided for in the GDPR to their non-EU
based customers. Many businesses also promote
respect for personal data as a competitive
differentiator and a selling point on the global
marketplace, by offering innovative products and
services with novel privacy or data security
solutions.436
Bradford relates that, as companies have failed in lobbying efforts to
stop the European Union from regulating through the GDPR, their
response may be the “if you cannot beat them, join them” type,
lobbying home governments for “EU-equivalent regulation at
home.”437 Embracing the GDPR through company compliance efforts
may be a way to prepare for any such eventuality, such as GDPRinspired U.S. State-level legislation.438
The GDPR provides incentives for compliance, in the form of
factors to be taken into account by DPAs in issuing administrative

435

See Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 338.
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council, Data Protection as a Pillar of Citizen’s Empowerment and the
EU’s Approach to the Digital Transition – Two Years of Application of the
General Data Protection Regulation, at 3, COM (2020) 264 final (June 24,
2020).
437
ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION
RULES THE WORLD 256 (2020) (Bradford ties this position to the levellingthe-playing-field argument discussed in Section 1 above: “Given that these
firms already have to bear the costs of complying with EU rules, they now
have the incentive to advocate further externalization of the single market to
their home markets: a strategy that allows them to level the playing field with
respect to their domestic, non-export-oriented competitors which, absent
domestic regulation, remain unaffected by EU regulations.” Id.).
438
See Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 340–41 (For example, this action
might be true with respect to the California Consumer Privacy Act, as it may
also help create efficiencies within firms by applying a high data protection
standard worldwide); see Voss, supra note 395, at 500–01 (Washington State,
among other jurisdictions, has also proposed legislation inspired by the
GDPR).
436
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fines, somewhat reminiscent of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.439
Supervisory authorities are to weigh various factors in deciding
whether to impose administrative fines or not, and at which level.440
These factors include the “nature, gravity and duration of the
infringement,”441 “the intentional or negligent character of the
infringement,”442 whether the controller or processor had previous
infringements,443 and the categories of data infringed,444 among others.
However, other factors allow for the controller or processor to take
action in order to improve its position when potential administrative
fines are considered or their amount set: for example, action taken by
it to mitigate data subject damage,445 cooperation with the DPAs to
remedy the infringement or to mitigate,446 the fact that the controller or
processor notifies the infringement to the DPA itself,447 or adherence
to an approved code of conduct or certification mechanism.448 Thus,
through its understanding of the GDPR, and through adapting its
organization and processes to take such measures, a company may
seize the opportunity to improve its situation in the unfortunate case of
an infringement.
Certain companies may see compliance choices through the
prism of risk.449 They may model this risk based on various factors,
such as “formal penalties, reputational impacts on customers,
organizational morale costs, relations with regulators, and perceptions
of society.”450 In the context of the GDPR, given its short period of
application to date, there is a chance that any such model would be
skewed, given the implementation time that has been needed prior to
jurisdictions such as Ireland being ready to assess major administrative
fines. That is, the “formal penalties” factor would potentially be
understated and reduce the modelized consequences of noncompliance. If we imagine that firms engage in a tradeoff between

439

See Voss, supra note 16, at 818–19.
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2).
441
Id. art. 83(2)(a).
442
Id. art. 83(2)(b).
443
Id. art. 83(2)(e).
444
Id. art. 83(2)(g).
445
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2)(c).
446
Id. art. 83(2)(f).
447
Id. art. 83(2)(h).
448
Id. art. 83(2)(j).
449
See Bird & Park, supra note 408, at 297.
450
Id. at 299.
440
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expending resources for compliance or, alternatively, accepting to pay
sanctions,451 their analysis would potentially be erroneous.
Indeed, there have been signs that companies—and first among
them, the U.S. Tech Giants—should expect significant administrative
sanctions in the future. First, the head of the Irish DPA—Helen Dixon,
the Data Protection Commissioner—has sounded the alarm that
concluding major investigations into what are surely the U.S. Tech
Giants, is the Irish DPA’s top priority.452 Earlier in the year, she is
reported to have said that “rulings involving Twitter, Facebook and
others were coming.”453 In 2019, she commented that fines will be
“substantial.”454 Just before the application date for the GDPR, Dixon
said, in answer to a question on whether she had a message for
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and other tech executives, “they
should expect her to use her new powers to “to the fullest.”455
Dixon put the risk of sanctions in terms that a compliance
officer can understand, referring at the start to the one-off fine that FTC
had previously announced against Facebook:
“While big figures have been bandied about in
terms of a one-off settlement, the GDPR is going to be
with us probably for another 20 years,” said Dixon.
“And in each of the investigations, fines can be applied
in each separate case.”
“As new issues keep arising, we’ll keep
investigating and pursuing,” she said. “So in a very
theoretical sense, if we’re forced based on a risk-based

451
Id. at 301 (“The choice to either invest in compliance or pay the cost of
non-compliance implies imperfect substitutes. Firms can switch between
compliance and sanction, but the tradeoff is not identical.”).
452
See Goodbody, supra note 418 (“The Data Protection Commissioner has
said concluding investigations that are underway into large multinational tech
firms is the number one priority for her office,” and has previously mentioned
investigations into Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and Twitter).
453
Privacy Advocates’ Complaints Overwhelm Data Protection Office, IRISH
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020, 16:49),
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/privacy-advocatescomplaints-overwhelm-data-protection-office-1.4240175.
454
Angelique Carson, Dixon at Senate Hearing: Fines are Coming; They Will
be ‘Substantial’, IAPP (May 2, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/dixon-atsenate-hearing-fines-are-coming-they-will-be-substantial/.
455
Satariano, New Privacy, supra note 417.
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analysis to keep opening investigations, the fines are
going to mount up over time.”456
Furthermore, mounting pressure is being placed on Ireland to act457
from many sources, such as EU government leaders,458 privacy
advocates459 and other DPAs.460 Nonetheless, the Irish DPA is reported
to have provided a draft decision on an investigation of Twitter to other
EU DPAs under the OSS mechanism.461 Moreover, given the results of
456

Nancy Scola, Irish Data Official Defends Tech Investigation Record:
‘They’re not Overnight’, POLITICO (May 4, 2019, 9:57 AM CET, updated May
6, 2019, 3:13 PM CET), https://www.politico.eu/article/helen-dixon-irishdata-official-defends-tech-investigation-record-theyre-not-overnight/.
457
See, e.g., Mark Scott, EU Privacy Enforcer Hits Make-or-Break Moment,
POLITICO (May 21, 2020, 6:00 AM CET),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/21/europe-data-protection-agencyireland-272889 (“With the two-year anniversary of Europe's privacy
standards coming next Monday, Dixon is under mounting pressure to show
that her agency can act.”).
458
See Satariano, Europe’s Privacy, supra note 417 (“The inaction is creating
tensions within European governments, as some leaders call for speedier
enforcement and broader changes.”).
459
See Open Letter: EDRi Urges Enforcement and Actions for the 2 Year
Anniversary of the GDPR, EDRI (May 25, 2020), https://edri.org/open-letteredri-urges-enforcement-and-actions-for-the-2-year-anniversary-of-the-gdpr/
(the user digital rights organization, without naming Ireland specifically,
wrote to the Commission to “urge action to tackle the GDPR’s vast
enforcement gap.”); see also NOYB - European Center for Digital Rights,
NOYB Letter to the European Data Protection Authorities, the European
Data Protection Board, the European Commission and the European
Parliament (May 25, 2020), https://noyb.eu/sites/default/files/202005/Open%20Letter_noyb_GDPR.pdf (“The GDPR is only as strong as its
weakest DPA: In practice, this is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the
Irish DPC has so far not issued a single fine under the GDPR against a
private actor, despite reporting 7,215 complaints in 2019 and staff of more
than 130. It comes as no surprise that Google immediately tried to switch to
the jurisdiction of the Irish DPC right after the French CNIL issued its fine in
the parallel procedure cited above.”).
460
See Scott, supra note 457 (describing some EU regulators as considering
that Ireland is “dragging its feet.” “‘You don’t hear anything about cases
transferred to Ireland,’ says Johannes Caspar, head of Hamburg’s data
protection regulator, whose agency is the first port of call for privacy
complaints about almost all U.S. tech firms in Germany. ‘What goes on, what
types of information was exchanged, we don’t get any of that. We’re here just
standing and waiting.’”).
461
Natasha Lomas, First Major GDPR Decisions Looming on Twitter and
Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (May 22, 2020, 9:30 PM CEST),
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the Commission’s two-year GDPR evaluation detailed in part II.D.,
greater cooperation between DPAs and additional funding for DPAs
such as the Irish DPA should be forthcoming, which should help further
enforcement and lead to larger fines of the U.S. Tech Giants that violate
the GDPR, as provided for in the GDPR, unless they categorically
abandon the European market, which is unrealistic. In this context, the
GDPR’s cooperation and consistency mechanism should be of great
use.
B. Risks Involved with GDPR Non-Enforcement
As Wojciech Rafał Wiewiórowski—the European Data
Protection Supervisor—recently stated, “Effective enforcement is an
important element of any data protection framework.”462 An evaluation
of the effectiveness of GDPR enforcement to-date is relevant to this
study, and the institutional evaluation of the GDPR has been detailed
in Part II.D.
DPA communications are important as indicating what action
the regulator intends to take, thus providing companies with
information that will help shape their compliance programs.
Interestingly, DPAs have tended to minimize the role of sanctions or,
alternatively, to highlight the policy goals for their use, while many
companies have been focused on the issue. For example, the ICO
addressed the issue of GDPR sanctions early on in a “myth-busting”
blog post.463 Information Commissioner Elizabeth Denham said that
the GDPR “is not about fines,” adding that it is “about putting the
consumer and the citizen first.”464 She emphasized the educational role
played by the DPA, and the importance of other enforcement tools
which have an impact on reputation:
… it’s scaremongering to suggest that we’ll be
making early examples of organisations for minor

https://techcrunch.com/2020/05/22/first-major-gdpr-decisions-looming-ontwitter-and-facebook/.
462
European Data Protection Supervisor, The EDPS Strategy 2020 – 2024:
Shaping a Safer Digital Future (2020),
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/20-0630_edps_shaping_safer_digital_future_en.pdf.
463
Elizabeth Denham, GDPR – Sorting the Fact from the Fiction, ICO BLOG
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-andblogs/2017/08/blog-gdpr-sorting-the-fact-from-the-fiction/ (“Myth #1: The
biggest threat to organisations from the GDPR is massive fines.”).
464
Id.
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infringements or that maximum fines will become the
norm.
The ICO’s commitment to guiding, advising
and educating organisations about how to comply with
the law will not change under the GDPR. We have
always preferred the carrot to the stick.
… we have yet to invoke our maximum
powers.
Predictions of massive fines under the GDPR
that simply scale up penalties we’ve issued under the
Data Protection Act are nonsense.
Don’t get me wrong, the UK fought for
increased powers when the GDPR was being drawn
up. Heavy fines for serious breaches reflect just how
important personal data is in a 21st century world.
But we intend to use
proportionately and judiciously.

those

powers

And while fines may be sledgehammer in our
toolbox, we have access to other tools that are wellsuited to the task at hand and just as effective.
Like the DPA, the GDPR gives us a suite of
sanctions to help organisations comply – warnings,
reprimands, corrective orders. While these will not hit
organisations in the pocket – their reputations will
suffer a significant blow.
And you can’t insure against that.465
These comments are very interesting and illustrate the philosophy that
some regulators may develop, namely that the administrative sanctions
provided for in the GDPR mainly have an expressive function. From
this perspective, the symbolic function does not require effective
impositions of sanctions.466
Moreover, a discourse like that of the UK DPA emphasizes that
the attitude of DPAs towards sanctions is definitely that of a regulator,
and not that of a criminal judge whose job it is basically to pronounce
sentences if offenses are proven, as soon as the repressive rule is
465
466

Id.
See supra Part I. C.
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operative.467 In the case of regulators, it appears clearly that sanctions
are merely a means of fulfilling their role and enforcing the legal
framework set up by the lawmaker.468 In the initial phase, when the
GDPR had to be applied by businesses, the regulators' discourse was
that priority was given to education and support for actors to help them
to put in place solutions to comply with the new regulation.469 Without
affirming that sanctions would not be imposed, the message was that
companies, especially SMEs, should not be overly afraid of sanctions
and that they should instead engage in a cooperative approach with the
regulator. Thus, there was a kind of two-fold caveat about sanctions:
(i) sanctions would not be the first response to difficulties in
immediately applying the new regulations; and (ii) the regulation
would differentiate between large firms and smaller firms with less
expertise to implement the GDPR. The interpretation to be given to the
position of regulators should therefore take into account that the initial,
"educational" phase may be over and that these reassuring words about
the risk of sanctions may not apply to tech giants. A third points should
be
mentioned:
Information
Commissioner
Denham’s
words express the opinion of a person responsible for a particular DPA,
especially one from a country that is no longer a member of the
European Union, with the end of the Brexit transition period soon

467

Daniel Ohana, Regulatory Offenses and Administrative Sanctions: Between
Criminal and Administrative Law, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law,
(M. D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, 2014).
468
Achour M. Taibi Achour, La justification du pouvoir de sanction des AAI
de régulation est-elle toujours pertinente? [Is the Justification for the
Sanctioning Power of Regulatory IAAs Still Relevant?], 84 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 463, 463 (2013).
469
See Catherine Stupp, Falque-Pierrotin Leaves Top EU Post Before Dawn
of
‘New Era’
for
Privacy,
EURACTIV
(Feb.
8,
2018),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/data-protection/interview/falque-pierrotinleaves-top-eu-post-before-dawn-of-new-era-for-privacy/ (quoting Isabelle
Falque-Pierrotin, then outgoing head of the Article 29 Data Protection
Working and head of the CNIL about then-forthcoming application of the
GDPR, “It means the national authorities have to invest also in regulatory
dialogue with the actors to provide them with a compliance tool that is very
flexible, deciding the provision of the regulation in a more operational way.
We’ve started this sectoral conversation with the actors in France and I believe
in most of the countries we’re going to have this type of demand from
stakeholders. Because of course they want to avoid fines, it’s normal. It’s our
job as regulators to help them comply. Our job is not to have fines at any
price.”).
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ahead on December 31, 2020.470 It cannot be excluded that divergences
between the policies pursued by the different national DPAs will
increase during the current period. The DPAs might have different
ideas on whether the initial pedagogical phase is over and whether it is
not appropriate to have strong expectations vis-à-vis the tech giants.471
These advanced or dissenting assessments could lead some DPAs to
consider applying sanctions against tech giants, as the French CNIL
has started to do against Google, or even to consider applying severe
sanctions, as it is not yet the case.
While such measures may have many goals, including perhaps
some political ones, they should be modelled in a way that does not
undercut the theoretical goals of the GDPR’s sanctions, including
notably the deterrence function discussed in Part I.D. Furthermore, the
lack of heavy sanctions and of effective enforcement by the Irish DPA
to date poses a difficulty in light of the theory of sanctions. Particularly,
to date sanctions have not been significantly large so as to sufficiently
encourage the U.S. Tech Giants to comply with the GDPR.
Furthermore, effective sanctioning is needed for the symbolic function,
to send a message to market participants. This has been lacking in
Ireland up to present. Finally, as this study discussed in Section III.A.,
companies do analyze past sanctions through modeling to evaluate risk
of non-compliance. Thus, there is a danger that a lack of large, effective
sanctions, may be giving a signal that the U.S. Tech Giants may
continue to consider the risk of GDPR sanctions as a mere cost of doing
business.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Two and one-half years after Axelle Lemaire made her
comment about sanctions, and two months after the GDPR entered into
application, Facebook’s shares lost about from twenty percent to a
quarter of their value, attributed in part to expected costs of the privacyenhancing requirements of the GDPR and also to loss of users due to
scandals such as the Cambridge Analytica case involving misuse of
470

UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson is reported to have indicated that the UK
would diverge from the European Union on data protection law when the blocs
split. There is also no guarantee that the UK will receive an adequacy decision
for cross-border data transfers. See Jorge Valero & Samuel Stolton, LEAK:
Commission Pushes UK for ‘High Degree of Convergence’ in GDPR Review,
EURACTIV
(June
23,
2020,
updated
June
24,
2020),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/leak-commission-pushes-ukfor-high-degree-of-convergence-in-gdpr-review/ (If no agreement is reached
on an adequacy decision, controllers will not be able to export personal data
from the European Union to the UK without additional safeguards.).
471
See Golla, supra note 67, at 72–73.
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personal data.472 In the market value ranking of the U.S. Tech Giants,
the two companies arguably the most dependent on the use of personal
data for advertising—Google and Facebook—both slipped between
2017 and 2019. Alphabet (Google) went from second to fourth place
and Facebook from fourth to fifth.473 This article argues that Lemaire’s
comment and the news are related—that the fact of having higher
sanctions—if effectively applied—should give Facebook (and other
data-consuming companies) the incentive it needs to comply with EU
data protection law, and that, although compliance may involve costs,
it in turn may result in benefits to firms (such as the avoidance of
sanctions and related legal costs and staff time, or eventually increased
trust in the eyes of the consumer and thus advanced compliance with
personal data law may ultimately appear to be a competitive advantage
in the market compared to other less scrupulous companies.)474 and
further, that previously the lack of adequate sanctions gave companies
such as Facebook no effective incentive originating in law to truly
guarantee user data protection. Effective and substantial fines should
result in the deterrence effect, which perhaps does not yet exist because
of the failure to date of the Irish DPA to bring to completion
enforcement action against the U.S. Tech Giants.
Also, DPAs must pay more attention to the message that they
communicate. While DPAs such as the United Kingdom’s ICO might
be eager to reassure stakeholders that “Predictions of massive fines . .
. are nonsense,” as Commissioner Denham was quoted as saying in Part
III.B., they should consider the impact that this has on the deterrent
effect of those same sanctions, especially on the U.S. Tech Giants and
similar companies in China, India, and elsewhere. While such
measures may have many goals, including perhaps some political ones,
they should be modelled in a way that does not undercut the theoretical
472
See Vengattil Munsif & Dave Paresh, Facebook's Grim Forecast: Privacy
Push Will Erode Profits for Years, REUTERS (July 25, 2018, 10:11 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-results/facebooks-grimforecast-privacy-push-will-erode-profits-for-years-idUSKBN1KF2U5. See
also, Hannah Kuchler, Facebook Shares Take a Hit After Poor Results, FIN.
TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c0097b18-9028-11e8bb8f-a6a2f7bca546.
473
See Kenneth Kiesnoski, The Top 10 US Companies by Market
Capitalization, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2017, 7:53 AM EST, updated Oct. 24, 2017,
2:22 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/08/the-top-10-us-companiesby-market-capitalization.html (For the ranking as of October 24, 2017).
474
See Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 334–40 (Arguing that compliance
with provisions of the GDPR, even beyond what is necessary, for example by
extending GDPR-like protections to consumers worldwide, may constitute an
element of legal strategy).
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goals of the GDPR’s sanctions, including notably the deterrence
function discussed in Part I.D. The other conclusion that can be drawn
from the preceding remarks is that it would be important that the
different policies of the DPAs regarding the use of sanctions be
harmonized, both for the legal certainty in favor of businesses and for
the credibility of the regulatory policy.
Nonetheless, as a result of this potential for greatly reinforced
enforcement measures and sanctions in the near future, companies
(especially the U.S. Tech Giants) must ensure that their risk assessment
tools are not too grounded in the past, and adequately take count of
probable future changes. They should consider that big sanctions—
those that deter violations and demand compliance—are presumably
on their way in Ireland and perhaps elsewhere.
In their discussion of GDPR compliance,475 Voss and Houser
refer to a legal strategy theoretical framework of compliance pathways
developed by Bird.476 Five stages are detailed in that framework:
avoidance, compliance, prevention, advantage, and transformation,
ordered with respect to the degree of business transformation, with the
highest degree at the end (transformation).477 Indeed, compliance with
regulation not only may reward companies with trust but may bring
other benefits, which argues in favor of companies’ embracing
compliance. As an example, by making efforts to comply with the
GDPR, companies will be preparing themselves for future changes to
laws of countries that will be impacted by the GDPR, through
negotiations between them and the European Union leading to
adequacy decisions. Thus, embracing the GDPR now will prepare them
for the future in other jurisdictions, including U.S. states whose
legislation is inspired by the GDPR.478 Furthermore, even new
economic actors may pop up, seizing an opportunity, such as those of
the privacy tech sector.479
Looking forward, the reader could imagine an extreme case of
the risk of sanctions (for example the maximum incurred) applied to
one of the U.S. Tech Giants, motivated by an anti-U.S. Tech Giants usversus-them spirit. A national DPA such as the CNIL could react
475

Id. at 329–40.
Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1
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vigorously against a clear or even scandalous violation of the rights of
Internet users (think of the Cambridge Analytica affair) and seek to
"mark the spirits" by imposing an exemplary sanction. The impact
would not only be financial for the sanctioned company; it would also
be competitive. The digital services offered by the tech giants are partly
specific and partly common to the different companies. For example,
Google is dominant on the market for search engines,480 Facebook is
dominant on the market for social networks, and so on.481 However, the
various giants are in competition with each other in part of their
business, particularly in the advertising exploitation of site traffic from
the platforms that these companies offer.482 Each company, therefore,
runs the risk of being threatened by a regulatory decision that would
weaken it and affect user confidence vis-à-vis it. If one of the dominant
companies in the digital economy commits serious violations of the
GDPR and is therefore heavily sanctioned (through a heavy fine and a
compliance order), then that company risks being seriously harmed.
The exploitation of personal data is at the heart of their business model.
If it is the way it collects, processes, and trades data that is considered
to be contrary to the GDPR, then its business model needs to be
thoroughly revised.483 Such a challenge would certainly be costly and
time-consuming to implement. In the meantime, there is a risk that
competing firms may gain a lead that the sanctioned firm may have
difficulty catching up to. The history of the digital economy, and of
technology firms more generally, has shown that apparent dominance
at one point in time does not prevent rapid relegation.484 Thus, the
challenge for each tech giants is not only to be sufficiently compliant
480
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with the GDPR in order not to be exposed to sanctions, but also not to
be less compliant than other major market players so as not to risk that
a possible sanction becomes a serious competitive disadvantage. While
this scenario remains hypothetical, it is a possibility that leads us to
recommend taking the risk of sanctions by the DPAs seriously.
CONCLUSION
Prior to the application of the GDPR, on May 25, 2018, one of
the results of the relatively-low-level of legislatively permitted data
protection violation administrative fines was, arguably, a lack of
compliance by U.S. Tech Giants, among others. At least on paper, this
changed under the GDPR. This study has approached the issue of
GDPR sanctions, not through the lens of a future catastrophe, but
through, first developing the theoretical grounds for sanctions, prior to
viewing the practical side of them. In doing so, it has been somewhat
unique and has added to the GDPR literature. Furthermore, it has
engaged the legal strategy and compliance literature to bring its results
home to inform companies as to the risks involved and to provide
strategic recommendations.
Of the several sub-goals of sanctions, this study has
determined that the most relevant for an analysis of GDPR sanctions—
which are administrative, regulatory, and financial sanctions, in large
part—is the deterrence function, beyond the symbolic functions. This
demands effective and substantial administrative fines. While these are
not the only sanctions available under the GDPR—this study has also
set out a range of possible sanctions, such as judicial compensation and
orders to halt data processing—they are perhaps the most characteristic
of data protection enforcement. However, through what is referred to
as the OSS mechanism, the Irish DPA is the lead authority for most of
the U.S. Tech Giants, and it has failed to act against them up to now,
resulting in a potential lack of deterrence.
This study argues that companies should not take this recent
past as a sign of the future, and should assume that bigger fines are
coming, including those that should be issued by Ireland’s DPA. This
is because Ireland has been hampered by problems of limited resources
but should be on the verge of a decision on Twitter, and the finalizing
of investigations against other U.S. Tech Giants. Pressure coming from
various sources (public opinion, peer DPAs, etc.) is being put on the
Irish DPA to do exactly this, and the OSS and cooperation and
consistency mechanisms under the GDPR should help. Furthermore,
the Commission is pushing Member States to provide greater resources
to DPAs, and the EDPB to work on greater cooperation among DPAs.
Thus, companies should seize the reputational and other benefits of
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GDPR compliance, and not base compliance risk modeling on the
sanctions that have been issued during what has turned out to be the
GDPR’s breaking-in period.
At the same time, DPAs (and the EDPB) must be aware of the
importance of enforcement action. Truly dissuasive administrative
fines must be issued in order for the sanctions to have their necessary
deterrence effect. Furthermore, as has been shown, companies watch
the past to predict the future, so it is important to signal to them that
compliance is being taken very seriously.

